

MODERN PERSPECTIVES FOR TACTICAL LEVEL
OPERATIONS IN THE ARCTIC REGION

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Joint Planning Studies

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Vitalie Micov, Major, National Army Republic of Moldova
B.Tech, Military College, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, 2001

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Vitalie Micov

Thesis Title: Modern Perspectives for Tactical Level Operations in the Arctic Region

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
John R. Piloni, M.A.

_____, Member
Terry L. Beckenbaugh, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Paul Gardner, M.A.

Accepted this 14th day of June 2013 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

MODERN PERSPECTIVES FOR TACTICAL LEVEL OPERATIONS IN THE ARCTIC REGION, by Major Vitalie Micov, 124 pages.

This study analyzes the modern perspectives for tactical level operations in the Arctic region. This study examines the current activities and development of these ground tactical formations as part of the Russian Federation's Northern Fleet in the Arctic region. In addition, comparison and evaluation of the ground tactical formations, their adaptability to the operational environment, will illustrate a perspective of the military operations in the Arctic.

This study emphasizes the protection of strategic interests in the Arctic in regards to international security and regional stability, as well as protection of new opened sea lines of communications and energy resources. It proves the necessity of maintaining a U.S. military presence in the Arctic based on the analysis of current Russian military activity.

Based on budget limitations and current technological advancements, the study concludes that the probability of military conflict in the Arctic region over the next 15 years remains low, and military presence in the Arctic should be limited to bilateral military cooperation and permanent air-space-sea monitoring to maintain control over the Arctic region.

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ACRONYMS

61 SKNIR	61st Separate Kirkeness Naval Infantry Regiment
200MIB	200th Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade
ALCOM	Alaskan Command
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CONUS	Continental United States
DoD	Department of Defense
JTF-AK	Joint Task Force Alaska
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFAF	Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
OE	Operational Environment
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RFMD	Russian Federation Military Doctrine
RNF	Russian Northern Fleet
RNNCG	Russian Northern Naval Command Group
RSS	Regional Situational Scenarios
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

In the 21st century, the Arctic became a topic of discussion in scientific and military circles. Ecology and the Northern Sea route, the unique social and economic environment, and the opening of new energy resources, all make the Arctic for both the United States and the Russian Federation an important region, requiring a balanced approach and constructive dialogue.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union initiated the readjustment of military powers around the Arctic Ocean. As the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States (U.S.) relocated part of its forces from Europe to the North American continent. These activities left Iceland and Greenland (an autonomous country under the Kingdom of Denmark) without the U.S. shield, “naked” in facing new threats from an unknown security environment. The newborn democratic Russia in early 1990s, initially focused on its internal political and economic problems, has since August, 2007 begun to conduct military activities in the Arctic Region. Once again becoming an important factor in the region.

Arctic states have also undertaken several security measures. Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark have established a collective defense memorandum, creating a new security organization entitled Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS).¹ Also U.S. and Canada have created a bilateral security

¹Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support Organization, “About NORDCAPS,” <http://www.nordcaps.org/?id=125> (accessed 24 December 2012).

organization which manages common strategic missile defense cooperation through North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).² Without any military support, Russia's main goal in the Arctic is to establish control over the international territories, such as the Northern Sea Route (internationally disputed waters), and fully develop the new found energy resources. These goals have the potential to create conflict within the Arctic region. Because of these signs for potential conflict it is necessary to examine how to conduct military operations in the Arctic region.

This thesis will examine modern perspectives of the tactical level operations in the Arctic region, as a means to establish conditions for tactical action. The main goal is to identify a number of factors which exist when conducting combat operations in the Arctic region, as well as to analyze the military capabilities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region. The benefits of an analysis of current Russian capabilities will be important for future military leaders of the U.S. in confronting the problems with conducting combat operations in the Arctic environment. By evaluating current and future military capabilities the author expects possible Russian military activities against international interests in the region. The thesis may also lead to developing or updating the current operational plans and principles for training troops in the U.S. Army, which may operate in the Arctic.

Next, an overall understanding of the situation within the Arctic region will be described. Some historical, social, cultural, geographic, functional, and economic aspects

²North American Aerospace Defense Command, "About NORAD," <http://www.norad.mil/about/index.html> (accessed 24 December 2012).

will be examined.³ The role and existing military capabilities of the major regional actors, the U.S. and the Russian Federation, will also be described.

Situational Understanding

History

The Arctic has always attracted explorers from around the world by providing the opportunity to discover new territories. The first Arctic expeditions required enormous physical and mental capabilities to overcome the climate and geographic conditions of the region. All types of economic possibilities motivated the international community to begin discovering new Arctic territories. John Franklin (1786-1847),⁴ Otto Schmidt (1891-1956),⁵ Rual Amundsen (1872-1928),⁶ and Willem Barentsz (approximately 1550-1597),⁷ were some of the most famous Arctic explorers. The exploration of these

³In accordance with guidance described in Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers*, 7th ed. (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 15.

⁴Franklin was an officer in the Royal Navy and an Arctic explorer. He made maps of over 3,000 miles of the coastline of north Canada. He died in 1847 on his last Arctic expedition to find the North-West Passage. Royal Museums Greenwich, "Explorers and Leaders," National Maritime Museum, [http://www.rmg.co.uk/explore/sea-and-ships/facts/explorers-and-leaders/sir-john-franklin-\(1786-1847\)](http://www.rmg.co.uk/explore/sea-and-ships/facts/explorers-and-leaders/sir-john-franklin-(1786-1847)) (accessed 26 December 2012).

⁵Soviet scientist, mathematician, astronomer, geophysicist, statesman, academician, hero of the USSR (27 June 1937), and member of the Communist Party. Wikipedia, "Otto Shimdt," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Schmidt (accessed 26 December 2012).

⁶Norwegian Arctic explorer. In 1903 he started the expedition. He had to sleep in the Far North three times. Yet in 1906, travelers came to the shores of California. First they went around America from the north. They had not been able to conduct the same activity before.

⁷The Dutch explorer Willem Barentsz wanted to find the Northern Sea route. He found Spitsbergen and an ocean was named after him, but his dream of finding a new

northern territories led to the discovery of the “Northern Sea route.” This route shortened the maritime distance between Europe and Asia, which creates an economic advantage for what nation controls the route.

“The Alaska Purchase”⁸ in 1867, resulted in U.S. political affairs materializing in the Arctic. Given the common colonial interests of Great Britain, Russia, and the U.S., “The Alaska Purchase” is arguably the starting point in Arctic affairs between the Arctic states. Economic and security interests concerning the region brought about major political disputes between these countries.

The Russian Federation is historically the most determined and assertive player in the Arctic. The Russian Arctic stretches over 4,000 miles east to west, encompasses the entire northern coast of Eurasia (with the exception of Norway’s coast). Russia has ongoing territorial disputes with Canada and Denmark over the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges. Initially, to understand why the Arctic is of such great importance to Russia, it is necessary to understand some historical background.

The Arctic history of the 20th century is filled with a number of discoveries which were of great interest to the leaders of both the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union. Gathering and exploring new territories and waterways of the Arctic Ocean, which was initially limited by early technical developments, was one of Russia’s main

route to Asia ended on the eastern shores of Novaya Zemlya. Jonas Sjøkvist Karlsbakk, “Northern Sea Routes First Challenger,” The Norwegian Barents Secretariat, 10 July 2012, <http://www.barents.no/northern-sea-routes-first-challenger.5072594-41098.html> (accessed 26 December 2012).

⁸The Alaska Purchase was the acquisition of the Alaska territory from the Russian Empire in 1867 by the U.S. in a treaty ratified by the Senate. America’s Library, “Purchase of Alaska March 30, 1867,” Library of Congress, http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/recon/jb_recon_alaska_1.html (accessed 27 December 2012).

priorities for the region. After construction of the first heavy icebreaker ship “Ermak” in 1899 (the invention of Admiral Stephan Makarov),⁹ problems which the Russian Royal Navy encountered as a result of the thick ice were solved, and a new stage of Arctic Ocean discoveries began. New icebreaking capabilities permitted the determination of northern boundaries and identification of river approaches to the Arctic Ocean. In 1913, a Russian Northern Ocean geographic expedition made the first attempt at using the Northeast Passage and arrived at Murmansk, only to find the northern part of the Taymir Peninsula (Cape Chelyuskin) was blocked with heavy ice. During Soviet times (the period of time from 1917-1991), the state placed high importance on the exploration of the Northern Sea route. In March 1921, Vladimir Lenin (leader of Soviet Russia) ordered the creation of the Floating Marine Scientific Research Institute. The activities of this Institute were concentrated in the Arctic Ocean, adjacent seas and estuaries of rivers, and islands and coasts of Soviet Russia. Between 1923 and 1924, the Soviets built 19 polar meteorological stations on the coast and islands of the Arctic Ocean. The history of Soviet Arctic research from 1930 to 1940 marked the passage of the Northern Sea route and heroic flights across the North Pole, which created a whole new way to reach and explore the North Pole. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian activity in the Arctic was significantly reduced due to other economic priorities during that period. The 21st century becomes another page in Russian Arctic history.

⁹Stephan Makarov was a Russian vice-admiral, a highly accomplished and decorated commander of the Imperial Russian Navy, an oceanographer, was honored with an award by the Russian Academy of Sciences, and author of several books. Makarov also designed a small number of ships.



Figure 1. Map of the Arctic Region

Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, "Arctic Region," The University of Texas at Austin, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/polar.html> (accessed 21 May 2013).

Society

The social system in the Arctic consists of inhabitants from Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, the U.S., Canada, and Denmark with Greenland. The Arctic is home to about four million people. The minor entities (those represented by less than 5,000 people) who live in the Arctic region are trying to maintain their culture and traditions:

The Arctic is inhabited by several different groups of indigenous people, and also by relatively recent immigrants of mostly European background. In Alaska, for example, indigenous people account for about 70% or more of the total population in mainland areas bordering the Bering, Chukchi, or Beaufort Seas. In Russia, only 15% or fewer of the inhabitants along the north coast are indigenous people. There are three main groups of Alaska Natives, the Inuit, Aleut, and Indian, while in Russia; there are 16 recognized minority indigenous peoples. The total populations of indigenous people in the Alaskan and Russian Arctic are about 50,000 and 70,000 respectively. The Canadian Arctic has about 50,000 indigenous people, representing 50% of the total population of the area, from three recognized groups: Indian, Inuit, and Métis. Inuit people are also found in Greenland.¹⁰

After the end of the Cold War in 1991, economically developed northern countries created a number of organizations to support social, economic and political development in the Arctic region. One such organization is the Arctic Council (AC). In 1996, the Ottawa Declaration formally established the AC as a high-level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states; in particular, issues of permanent development and environmental protection of the Arctic.¹¹ The approved membership of the AC includes:

¹⁰National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Frequently Asked Questions about the Arctic. Who lives in the Arctic?” Department of Commerce, <http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/faq.html#8> (accessed 27 December 2012).

¹¹The Arctic Council, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” Arctic Council Secretariat, <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/history> (accessed 27 December 2012).

Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the U.S.¹²

Culture

Arctic culture had an important impact on global history. Early Arctic people likely marched from Eurasia (Russian Chukotka) eastward across Alaska and northern Canada to Greenland.¹³ However, European cultural influences have limited the continuation of native customs and traditions. Russia provides one of the best examples in that Soviet communism overwhelmed the Northeastern Asia population in the 1920s. In order to increase the Soviet population and spread communist ideology to these minorities, the Soviets organized the economic and political activities of both coastal and inland Chukchi (natives). They established 28 state-owned enterprises in Chukotka which were run collectively and based on harvesting deer and sea mammals in the coastal areas. The Chukchi were educated in Soviet schools and even today almost 100 percent of Chukchi are literate in the Russian language.¹⁴ Because the Chukchi customs and traditions were different from Soviet communist ideology, most of them were destroyed or forgotten. At the moment, the Russian Federation is the largest Arctic country and has about 30 Russian villages and camps, with more than 10,000 people living beyond the Arctic Circle.

¹²The Arctic Council.

¹³United States History, "Arctic Culture," <http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h994.html> (accessed 27 December 2012).

¹⁴*Камчатский краеведческий сайт, Этнография Камчатки, Этнография Камчатки, Чукчи*, http://www.kamchatsky-krai.ru/geografy/korennoe_naselenie/chukchi.htm (accessed 27 December 2012).

Geography

According to the “The Encyclopedia of Earth,”¹⁵ the Arctic is a single, highly integrated system comprised of a deep, ice covered, and nearly isolated ocean surrounded by the land masses of Eurasia and North America, except for breaches at the Bering Strait and in the North Atlantic. It encompasses a range of land and seascapes, from mountains and glaciers to flat plains, from coastal shallows to deep ocean basins, from polar deserts to sodden wetlands, from large rivers to isolated ponds. The main characteristics of Arctic’s geography are: tundra, ice deserts, sea ice, rivers and lakes.¹⁶ This description of the Arctic operational environment leads to a general understanding of the enormous dimensions of the region and the environmental complexities which will require further build-up of the cross-arctic capabilities (i.e., icebreakers, scientific stations etc.).

Legitimacy

Legitimacy of the Arctic problems is an issue of specific importance. The legal aspects regarding the Arctic’s borders are still not defined. Continuous disputes over Arctic territories are leading to some international instability. According to international legal doctrine, the Arctic floor is traditionally understood as being a part of the globe, the center of which is the North geographic pole, and margin boundary—the Arctic Circle (66° 33 'N).¹⁷ Nevertheless, there is no international agreement establishing a universally

¹⁵The Encyclopedia of Earth, “Arctic,” <http://www.eoearth.org/>. (accessed 27 December 2012).

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Russian Geographical Society, “Arctic Legal Aspects,” 26 August 2010, <http://int.rgo.ru/arctic/arctic-overview/legal-status-of-the-arctic/> (accessed 27 December 2012).

accepted legal concept of the “Arctic.” The legal regime in the Arctic is determined by small pieces of national legislation of the Arctic states and international agreements, mainly in the field of environmental protection.¹⁸ In 2007, the Russian Government placed its flag over the North Pole. This initiated a number of international meetings regarding ownership of the Arctic floor. In 2013, Canada and Denmark realized the Russian intentions, and mirrored the Russian Federation, similarly submitted their individual claims to the arctic floor to the United Nations.

Economy

By some estimates, the Arctic is believed to hold 15 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its natural gas.¹⁹ There is no economic agreement among the Arctic States that clearly defines which state or states have the right to resources of the sea floor in the Arctic Ocean:

Arctic countries are conducting different political and economic measures to influence other countries to distinguish borderlines of Arctic Ocean sea floor. The eight arctic nations do participate in a constructive body known as the Arctic Council, which is an intergovernmental organization exclusive to the Arctic nations but that also grants observer status to interested states, several indigenous tribes, and a number of nongovernmental organizations.²⁰

¹⁸Russian Geographical Society.

¹⁹“Cold Comfort,” *The Economist*, 16 June 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21556805> (accessed 5 March 2013).

²⁰Peter Ohotnicky, Braden Hisey, and Jessika Todd, “Improving U.S. Posture in the Arctic,” *JFQ* 67 (4th Quarter 2012): 58.

At the moment, only two Arctic States, Russia and Norway have chosen the conventional method of defining the territories of the Arctic sea floor.²¹ Canada's position is based on the limits of its continental shelf. The U.S. position is to not participate in the Convention of the Arctic's Territorial Demarcation and limit itself on the extent of its continental shelf. In 2008, the topic of the active development of the Arctic territories gained widespread attention among global politicians, especially regarding public policy. Arctic states are considering different types of scenarios of potential conflict in the Arctic (including the use of military force), and are developing strategies for dealing with actors using various instruments of power (diplomatic, legal, political, economic, informational, etc.).

The Role of the Military as an Instrument of National Power

Regardless of the fact that the Arctic region holds important interests for various nations (including those with large military capabilities), the clash of the interests of the Russian Federation and the U.S. should not escalate to an armed conflict. But recent Russian Federation military activities in 2011 and 2012 represent an escalation of operations conducted in the Arctic region. In order to become familiar with the main military actors in the region, further information will be provided to aid in understanding the operational level military organizations of the U.S and the Russian Federation in the Arctic and their responsibilities for promoting regional security.

²¹Andrew A. Kramer, "Russia and Norway Agree on Boundary," *The New York Times*, 15 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/world/europe/16russia.html?_r=0 (accessed 19 May 2013).

U.S. Alaskan Command

The United States' Alaskan Command (ALCOM) was designed to defend the northern boundaries of the U.S. Today, ALCOM is a subunified command of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) responsible for integrating military activities within Alaska to maintain mission assurance, maximize the readiness of theater forces, and expedite the deployment and redeployment of forces in support of contingencies. ALCOM is headquartered at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Anchorage, Alaska. The command is comprised of the 11th Air Force, and the U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK), both are headquartered at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson. ALCOM's combined forces include more than 20,000 Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps personnel, along with 4,700 Guardsmen and Reservists.²²

Russian Military Presence in the Arctic

Russian military presence in the Arctic has increased in the last seven years. The Russians are looking for effective military and economic instruments to meet all potential territorial threats in the Arctic (such as terrorism, illegal border crossings, and piracy). The Russian Northern Fleet in 2012 became a major military capability to maintain control over the Arctic boundaries of the Russian Federation. In addition, in February 2012, the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces, General-Colonel Alexander Postnikov mentioned that three Russian Arctic brigades will be created (one Arctic brigade is a part of the Russian Northern Fleet) by 2015. Previously, In November 2011,

²²The Official Web Site of Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, "Alaskan Command," 23 March 2011, <http://www.jber.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5286> (accessed 14 January 2013).

the former Inspector General of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, stated that Russia will establish a Maritime Group (consisting of Naval, Naval infantry and Arctic infantry units) on the Northern Sea route because the Arctic is considered a potential theater of war.²³

Russian troops recently conducted exercises in the Arctic to demonstrate their capabilities of conducting seaborne operations. An exercise in October 2012, involved Russian Coastal forces of the Northern Fleet, which for the first time in the history of the Russian Navy, conducted amphibious assaults on the coast of Kotelniy Island on Novosibirsk's archipelago which is located between the Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea. During the exercise, the Marines successfully accomplished their tasks. During the landing operation, they explored new areas and landing sites in different places on the Arctic Coast, carried out reconnaissance of the islands of the archipelago, and tested the possibility of using military equipment and weapons in Arctic conditions.²⁴

Research Question

The main purpose of this paper is to identify a number of factors which exist in conducting combat operations in the Arctic region, as well as to analyze tactical military capabilities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. How does the Russian Federation develop tactical level military capabilities to support its strategic interests in the Arctic

²³Vadim Zazimco, "Arctic: Project of the Century," *Red Star*, 2012, <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/2011-07-25-15-55-34/item/1069-arktika-proekt-veka> (accessed 7 November 2012).

²⁴'Центральный орган Министерства обороны Российской Федерации,' *Red Star*, November 2012, <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/news-menu/vesti/tablo-dnya/item/4871-uchenie-v-arktike> (accessed 5 March 2013).

region? The study of these military capabilities will assist governments and military leaders in understanding the actual Russian interests and aid in planning for future operations in the Arctic region.

Secondary Questions

The following secondary questions will need to be addressed during the evaluation of the primary question: (1) What types of tactical level ground capabilities exist to support Russian political interests in the European Arctic? (2) What human resources are required to establish and maintain control over specific Arctic regions? And (3) How are the Russian tactical level military leaders managing training activities to maintain an essential pool of force, based on environmental specifications and mission requirements?

Assumptions

There are a number of assumptions made in the course of this study. The first assumption is that the number of Russian military activities in the Arctic region will increase. Second, it is assumed that the Russian military will require ten to fifteen years to build sufficient capabilities to achieve the intended political desires. The third assumption is that China, India, and Japan and possibly other political actors, will begin politically and militarily to participate in the region. Fourth, it is assumed that the current military capabilities of the Russian Government are not enough to conduct major military operations against other competitors.

Definition of Terms

During this project a number of definitions will be used to describe the situation in the Arctic region.

Arctic Circle: The Arctic Circle is one of the five major circles of latitude displayed on the maps of the Earth. In 2012, it is the parallel of latitude that runs 66° 33' 44" (or 66.5622°) north of the Equator. The region north of this circle is known as the Arctic, and the zone just to the south is called the Northern Temperate Zone. The equivalent polar circle in the Southern Hemisphere is called the Antarctic Circle.²⁵

Arctic Council: The Arctic Council is a high level intergovernmental forum which provides a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States involving Arctic issues, particularly those of sustainable development and environmental protection in the region.²⁶

Arctic Region: The Arctic is the region around the North Pole, usually understood as the area within the Arctic Circle. It includes parts of Russia, Scandinavia, Greenland, Canada, Alaska and the Arctic Ocean.²⁷

Arctic States: There are eight states which have territories in the Arctic region. These include: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S.

²⁵Arctic Portal, "About the Arctic Council," <http://arcticportal.org/arctic-council> (accessed 19 February 2013).

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Geographic Guide, "The Arctic Region," <http://www.geographicguide.com/arctic.htm> (accessed 19 February 2013).

Ice Operations: The Coast Guard conducts icebreaking services to assist vessels and communities in emergency situations and facilitate essential commercial maritime activities in the Great Lakes and Northeast regions. In 2008, the Coast Guard, in concert with the government of Canada and the commercial icebreaking industry, sustained navigable waterways for commercial traffic and assisted with 680 ice transits, representing the transport of over \$2 billion of cargo.²⁸

Northern Fleet: The Red Banner Northern Fleet (*Северный флот, Severnyy Flot*) is a unit of the Russian Navy responsible for the defense of northwestern Russia. The fleet has access to the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans from bases on the Barents and Norwegian Seas. The fleet headquarters and administrative center are located at the main base at Severomorsk with secondary bases in the Kola Bay.²⁹

Russian Arctic: The Russian Arctic islands are a number of island groups and sole islands scattered around the Arctic Ocean. The islands are all situated within the Arctic Circle and are scattered through the marginal seas of the Arctic Ocean namely the Barents Sea, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea, Chukchi Sea and Bering Sea. The area extends some 7,000 kilometers (4,350 miles) from Karelia in the west to the Chukchi Peninsula in the east.

Limitations

This study examines issues related to U.S. and Russian Federation operational military operations in the Arctic. All sources of information utilized in this project are

²⁸Wikipedia, “Russian Northern Fleet”http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Fleet (accessed 19 February 2013).

²⁹Ibid.

open to the public. No classified or restricted information will be used in this project, and the thesis will be approved for public release. Some political aspects of the problem are necessary to put operational issues into perspective. Reflection of the current military activity and other related matters concerning the extremely cold environment is important for future analysis. This research will provide analysis of current military capabilities within the Arctic region in order to reach conclusions about possible future combat operations.

Scope and Delimitations

The scope of this study is based on an analysis of current military activity of the Russian Federation within the Arctic region. Assessment of military capabilities at the tactical level of the ground component of the Russian North Fleet and RNNCG will be conducted through problem solving construct Functional System Analysis-DOTMLPF (evaluation of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities).³⁰ With an accent on force development criteria such as: Relevance of the doctrine, Troops Training and Readiness, and Manpower domains. Due to relevance of the research, the U.S. military terminology will be used to describe the military situation in the Arctic region. Research is limited to the 2010 to 2013 timeframe and existing projects on regional development will be covered up to the year 2020.

³⁰DOTMLPF is a problem-solving construct for assessing current capabilities and managing change. Change is achieved through a continuous cycle of adaptive innovation, experimentation, and experience. Change deliberately executed across DOTMLPF elements enables the Army to improve its capabilities to provide dominant landpower to the joint force. Department of the Army. Field Manual 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2005), <http://www.army.mil/fm1/chapter4.html#top> (accessed 19 February 2013).

Significance of the Study

The existing strategic level analysis model “Ways, Ends and Means,” will be utilized to assist in describing the strategic-operational level aspects of the Arctic region. “Ends” will be defined as the strategic documents and desired end states for strategic leadership, such as secured operational environment. “Ways” will be defined as the tactics, methods and procedures to achieve the ends, such as developing or updating doctrines, dissemination of military influence over the region. “Means” will be defined as the resources required achieving the ends, such as military forces, weapons systems, finance and time. The benefits of the analysis of current Russian capabilities will be important for future military leaders in confronting problems in conducting combat operations in the Arctic environment. By evaluating current in future military capabilities we can expect potential Russian military activities against our interest in the region.

Summary and Conclusions

To conclude this chapter it is necessary to mention the four most important issues regarding the Arctic: huge energy resources; rare and rare-earth metals, minerals, chemical elements and other raw materials of strategic importance; biological resources; the Northern Sea route and the so-called Northwest Passage as important transportation routes (not only to and from Russia and Canada, but also for other countries and regions in the world).³¹ All of these aspects can possibly ignite military conflicts between interested states, and the goal is to analyze and assess the risks and military capabilities of the major states like the Russian Federation.

³¹The path from East Asia to Europe and North America are much shorter and safer (in the absence of piracy) than through the Suez Canal.

The strategic and operational documents of the U.S. and the Russian Federation (Ends and Ways) related to the region will be examined. In 2007 an official announcement by Russian political leadership about the Arctic's strategic importance and its role in regional politics, received immediate reaction from the U.S. government. The National Security directives which maintain U.S. presence and protect its interests in the Arctic region were updated. As a counter action, Russian officials allocated financial support and revised a number of security policies and regional development programs for the Arctic.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Chapter 1 described the operational environment, historical aspects, social aspects and other factors. Political and military delineations within the Arctic region were also established. Chapter 1 concluded by reviewing the organizational portion of the project and providing the research question, supporting questions, limitations, delimitations, and the scope of the study. Chapter 2 will examine the political and security documents of the main political actors, the United States and the Russian Federation, in the Arctic region over the last five years (Ends and Ways). Arctic States have updated a number of strategic documents regarding security, social, and economic development of the region. The focus will be on examining security and military related documents from the U.S. and the Russian governments. All sources are open to the public and there will be no classified information in the project.

U.S. Strategic Planning Documents on the Arctic Region

Human activity in the Arctic region is increasing and is projected to increase further in coming years. This requires the United States to assert a more active and influential national presence to protect its Arctic interests and to project sea power throughout the region.³²

On 9 January 2009 the President Bush approved *National Security Presidential Directive 66* (NSPD 66) and *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25* and (HSPD

³²George W. Bush, *National Security Presidential Directive 66* (NSPD 66) and *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25* (HSPD 25) (Washington, DC: The White House, 9 January 2009), <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm> (accessed 18 March 2013), 2.

25) which defined the role of the U.S. in all potential disputes related to the Arctic. The directive (that comprises both documents NSPD 66 and HSPD 25) supersedes a similar document from 1994. When compared to the interests listed in a 1994 document, President Bush reflects an increased U.S. interest in the Arctic region. U.S. interests, as identified in the directive, are seen in light of developments of the last decade, including: altered national policies on homeland security and defense, effects of climate change and increased human activity in the region, the establishment and ongoing work of the AC, and an awareness of resources in the Arctic.³³ These actions outlined in this document include improving the U.S. ability to protect its air, sea, and land borders, as well increasing awareness of the maritime domain capability in order to support commerce, critical infrastructure, and key resources.

Important strategic aspects of the NSPD 66/HSPD 25 are based on the estimation of new water routes (Northeastern Passage and Northwestern Passage) which will open during the summer. These passages are economically more advantageous for maritime shipping than other water routes such as the Suez and Panama Canals. These northern sea routes connect the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, the Northwest Passage via the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, and the Northeast Passage along the Russian Arctic coast from the Barents Sea along Siberia. In the past, these routes have been completely impassable due amount of thick sea ice, which was present year round. However, climate

³³GeoPolitics in the High North, “Arctic Strategy Documents-U.S. Arctic Region Policy,” Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84&limitstart=3 (accessed 7 January 2013).

change has reduced the thick ice easing the navigability of the Arctic.³⁴ The availability of these new water passages could lead political leaders to launch new economic and security endeavors with a real necessity to maintain and establish closer cooperation among the Arctic states. The role of government agencies in developing additional Arctic related policies was decisive. The command and control mechanism reflected in NSPD 66/HSPD 25 requires involvement of the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, such as U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard.³⁵ They are to oversee the development and implementation of the directives in the Arctic region at the strategic and operational levels:

the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Defense to develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect U.S. borders; increase Arctic maritime domain awareness (MDA); preserve global mobility; project a sovereign United States maritime presence; encourage peaceful resolution of disputes; cooperate with other Arctic nations to address likely issues from increased shipping; establish a risk-based capability to address hazards in the region including cooperative search and rescue (SAR), basing and logistical support; and evaluate the feasibility for using the Arctic for strategic sealift.³⁶

The specific role of the Department of Defense (DoD) is stipulated in the implementation of the two major objectives of the NSPD 66/HSPD 25: Objective B. National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic, and Objective F. Maritime Transportation

³⁴Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut, A Report of the CSIS Europe Program, *U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic, An Assessment of Current Challenges and New Opportunities for Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Operational Studies, April 2010), http://csis.org/files/publication/100426_Conley_USStrategicInterests_Web.pdf (addressed 9 January 2013), 5.

³⁵Bush, part III.

³⁶Department of the Navy, "Navy Arctic Roadmap," 2009, www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/USN_artic_roadmap.pdf, (accessed 9 January 2013), 3.

in the Arctic Region.³⁷ Objective B is important because it covers main activities to support U.S. security interests in the Arctic region such as: missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight. The Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, stipulates in *Navy Arctic Roadmap* (NAR) that “ [NAR] also protects fundamental homeland security interests by preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the U.S. vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region.”³⁸

Freedom of the seas is established as a key national priority, especially in correlation with the opening of new Northeast and Northwest straits. Guidelines for implementation of Objective B are:

1. Develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect U.S. air, land, and sea borders in the Arctic region;
2. Increase Arctic maritime domain awareness in order to protect maritime commerce, critical infrastructure, and key resources;
3. Preserve the global mobility of U.S. military and civilian vessels and aircraft throughout the Arctic region;
4. Project a sovereign U.S. maritime presence in the Arctic in support of essential U.S. interests;
5. Encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region.³⁹

Objective F of Chapter III NSPD 66/HSPD 25 is significant because it defines key maritime factors for establishing a safe and secure environment for maritime activities through infrastructure development, high-risk area vessel-traffic management,

³⁷Department of the Navy, 2.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 3.

³⁹*Ibid.*

development of search and rescue capabilities, providing iceberg warnings and other sea ice information, and development of measures to protect the marine environment.

Activities in cooperation with other international organizations will assist in developing new programs to improve the safety and security of maritime operations. Objectives and actions stipulated in the NSPD 66/HSPD 25 directive framed future boundaries and structures, and agencies responsible for the Objective F implementation. Because of specific physical aspects of the Arctic region, the leaders of the DoD assigned missions to the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Marine Corps.

As a fundamental document for creation of the *Navy Arctic Roadmap*, the U.S. Navy bases its principles on *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power* (CS21)⁴⁰ created jointly in 2007 by all maritime forces of the U.S., which states:

Never before have the maritime forces of the United States—the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—come together to create a unified maritime strategy. This strategy stresses an approach that integrates seapower with other elements of national power, as well as those of our friends and allies. It describes how seapower will be applied around the world to protect our way of life, as we join with other like-minded nations to protect and sustain the global, interconnected system through which we prosper. Our commitment to protecting the homeland and winning our Nation’s wars is matched by a corresponding commitment to preventing war.⁴¹

CS21 was a key document, after the 1994 Presidential Directive NSPD-66, which details the range of possibilities for the maritime services in order to achieve strategic objectives in the Arctic region. Admiral J.W. Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations stated in the *Navy Arctic Roadmap* that, “Because the Arctic is primarily a maritime

⁴⁰Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Coast Guard, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power*, October 2007, www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf (accessed 9 January 2013), 3.

⁴¹*Ibid.*

environment, the Navy must consider the changing Arctic in developing future policy, strategy, force structure, and investment.”⁴²

The Department of the Navy released the *Navy Arctic Roadmap* on 10 November 2009 and it provided a chronological list of Navy action items, objectives, and desired effects for the Arctic region for Fiscal Year 2010-2014. The significance of this document is unquestionable due to its reflection on the most important activities for maintaining maritime control over the Arctic boundaries of the U.S. and neighboring sea waters. Also, a good number of objectives are reflected in the document which affects resourcing, training, and equipment programs of the Department of the Navy in cooperation with other agencies and services in near future.

In Roadmap Objective 2: Develop competency in accomplishing Arctic missions assigned by combatant commanders⁴³ CNO listed a number of actions, focused on the assessment of actual capabilities necessary to operate in the Arctic environment and the modifications to existing maritime doctrine. The objective stipulates specific areas of concern, which will be further reflected in naval manuals such as: Maritime Security, Search and Rescue, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR), Strategic Deterrence, Ballistic Missile Defense, and Integration with U.S. Coast Guard capabilities. Using “Ways” principles the Navy will cover multiple areas of concern which were considered to be gaps in the security related policies, and will enhance the level of interoperability between branches and services.

⁴²Department of the Navy, 1.

⁴³*Ibid.*

Another important aspect of the Roadmap Objective 2 stipulates how maritime forces will conduct activities oriented towards the establishment of cooperation and relationships, through participation in periodic Arctic exercises and operations conducted in Alaska with the participation of other Arctic stakeholders.

Unified Command Plan

According to Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, “The Unified Command Plan (UCP) represents an important document, approved by the President of United States, because it sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders (CCDRs); and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders.”⁴⁴

The origins of the UCP and Combatant Commands (COCOMs) were rooted in World War II. After the war, U.S. leaders, taking advantage of the lessons learned in both theaters, initiated a series of legislative changes that resulted in the current UCP process and COCOM construct. The significance of the UCP 2011 document is relevant due to command and control relationships over the Arctic region.⁴⁵

The information provided in the UCP 2011 assists subordinate in identifying the operational and tactical level military organizations responsible for providing security in

⁴⁴Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 376.

⁴⁵Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, “DoD Releases Unified Command Plan 2011,” 8 April 2011, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14398> (accessed 7 November 2012).

the Arctic region: ALCOM is a subordinate command of the USPACOM responsible for maximizing readiness of theater force for Alaskan service members and expediting worldwide contingency force deployments from and through Alaska as directed by the Commander, USPACOM.

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provided strategic guidance to the DoD. It established four priority objectives for the DoD: “prevail in today’s wars; prevent and deter conflict; prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.”⁴⁶ The QDR identified the opening of the Arctic waters for seasonal commerce in the decades ahead as a unique opportunity to work collaboratively in multilateral forums to promote a balanced approach to improving human and environmental security in the region. The QDR highlighted the need for DoD to work collaboratively with interagency partners to address gaps in Arctic communications, domain awareness, search and rescue, and environmental observation and forecasting capabilities to support both current and future planning and operations. It also reiterated DoD’s strong support for accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) to protect U.S. interests worldwide and to support cooperative engagement in the Arctic.⁴⁷

⁴⁶U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/> (accessed 13 January 2013), 1.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 8.

Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage

In May 2011, the leaders of the DoD provided a Report to Congress on Arctic operations addressing strategic national security objectives, mission capabilities, an assessment of changing the UCP, basing infrastructure, and the status of and need for icebreakers.⁴⁸ Generally the Report to Congress provides the overarching context on Arctic Operations and Northwest Passage and assesses the national security objectives in the region. The authors of the report assessed the capabilities needed to support the identified strategic objectives, and where gaps are identified, describes mitigation approaches to address them. In addition, it assessed the advantages and disadvantages of amending the UCP to designate a single COCOM for the Arctic region; assesses the basing infrastructure needed to support the identified strategic objectives, including the need for a U.S. deep-water port in the Arctic. Finally, it assessed the status of and need for icebreaking ships in the context of the capabilities to support national security objectives. By presenting this document to the Congress, the DoD became a main official actor for the U.S. government in the development of the Arctic region. The DoD's strategic objectives describe what had to be accomplished to achieve national security objectives in the Arctic. It is mentioned in Executive Summary of the report that, "All objectives are bound by policy guidance, the nature of the strategic and physical

⁴⁸Department of Defense, *Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage*, May 2011, www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf (accessed 13 January 2013), 8.

environment, and the capabilities and limitations of the instruments of power (military power, for the purposes of this report) available.”⁴⁹

Russian Federation Strategic Planning Documents on the Arctic Region

Our first and main task is to turn the Arctic into a resource base for Russia in the 21st century . . . Using these resources will guarantee energy security for Russia as a whole.⁵⁰

In 2007, after years of relative inactivity, the Russian Government turned attention of the world to the High North when it planted a Russian flag on the Arctic seabed as a symbolic territorial assertion.⁵¹ With that “historical” event, the world began to pay closer attention to the Arctic region. Later, strategic and operational planning documents approved by the Russian leadership demonstrated the increasing influence of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region, not only as the largest Arctic state, but also as a single owner (in their view) of all arctic benefits such as the Northeast Passage and the bulk of natural resources.

⁴⁹Department of Defense, *Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage*, 8.

⁵⁰Lyubov Pronina, “Medvedev Says Arctic Is Russia’s Future Resource Base,” September 2008, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=aeWA6DvRZntg&refer=europe> (accessed 7 January 2013).

⁵¹C. J. Chivers, “Russians Plant Flag on the Arctic Seabed,” *The New York Times*, 9 August 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/03/world/europe/03arctic.html?_r=0 (accessed 17 January 2013).

National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020

In May 2009, Moscow published its *National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020*.⁵² That document replaced the security concept from 1997 (modified in 2000), reflecting Russia's evolved security environment. This broad strategic document illustrates a complex approach to security from the perspectives of the Russian government. It describes current world trends and defined Russia's national strategic interests and priorities. Different from previous documents of the Russian Government (possibly using international expertise) this strategy avoids the military approach for national security. It identified threats and challenges within a wide concept of security related issues. The document has chapters titled as "National defense," "State security and civil protection," "Improvement of living standards," "Economic growth," "Research, technologies and education," "Healthcare," "Culture," "Ecology," and "Strategic stability and partnership."⁵³ In addition, this strategic document outlined the role of energy security as an important issue for this project. It is not surprising that the existing natural resources and management of the Russian exports of oil resources can serve as political tools. This document suggests that Russia sees itself in a position of advantage in this regard, able to influence the international arena.

The strategy of the Russian Government reflects the importance of the Arctic region in a long-term perspective. The main focus of the strategy is maintaining an international legal agreement for accessing energy reserves located in the seafloor of the

⁵²Russian Federation National Security Committee, Order No. 537, *Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года*, 12 May 2009, <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html> (accessed 17 January 2013).

⁵³*Ibid.*

Arctic Ocean, including on the continental shelf in the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic. In this context, the strategy maintains that problems resulting from competition over decreasing natural resources may be solved with the use of military force.

Bases of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2020

In September 2008, the Russian government published another important strategic document related to the militarization and the social development of the Russian Arctic. The ends, ways, and means described through state policy, strategic objectives, and national interests in the document, created a coherent picture of Russia's long-term development (10-15 years). Initially, the policy described the special conditions of the Russian Arctic and its influence over the entire development of the political system in the Russian Federation. These conditions include extreme natural and climatic conditions, including the permanent ice cover or drifting sea ice in Arctic seas. In addition, the industrial and economic development of the territories with low density population. Finally, the increased need for access to resources due to the dependence of the local population on fuel supplies, food and essential goods which were brought from other regions of Russia.⁵⁴ The Russian Federation also defines its national interests in the document which are significant when describing the strategic environment:

1. Use of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation for the social and economic development of the country;
2. Preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation;

⁵⁴Russian Federation National Security Council, *Russian Federation Political Basis in the Arctic for the Period of 2020 and Further Perspectives*, 18 September 2008, <http://www.rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html> (accessed 22 January 2013), 2.

3. The conservation of unique ecological systems in the Arctic;
4. Use of the Northern sea route as a national integrated transport communications route of the Russian Federation in the Arctic.⁵⁵

Analysis of these policies highlights some specific security issues within the region, and some of Russia's strategic priorities in the Arctic, which relate to the region's overall security environment. The security situation in the Arctic affects the boundaries for other foreign and Russian state agencies. One of Russia's strategic priorities was set prior to the 2009 publication of the U.S. strategic objectives in NSPD 66 and HSPD 25. This Russian strategic priority specifies the creation of an integrated regional system for search and rescue between Arctic Ocean coastal states and the prevention of and mitigation of man-made disasters, including the coordination of rescue forces. The document was not coordinated with or agreed upon by the U.S. or Canadian governments. This objective was important because it sought to enhance the interoperability and cooperation between all Arctic States and was later implemented through a limited number of different civilian-military activities between the Russian and the Norwegian governments only.⁵⁶ Another important aspect of this strategy was the intent for the future transit across North Pole air routes over the Arctic,⁵⁷ as well as use of

⁵⁵Russian Federation National Security Council, 2.

⁵⁶Luke Harding, "Russia and Norway Resolve Arctic Border Dispute," *The Guardian*, 15 September 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/15/russia-norway-arctic-border-dispute> (accessed 19 May 2013).

⁵⁷Ray Massey and Arthur Martin, "Airlines Given Permission to Fly over North Pole for the First Time Slashing the Hours to Exotic Destinations," 25 December 2011, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2078301/Mind-sleigh-Airlines-given-permission-fly-North-Pole-time-slashing-hours-exotic-destinations.html> (accessed 19 May 2013).

the Northern sea route for international sea navigation. These in turn bring a number of difficulties for the international community, since Russia believes it owns the Northern sea route. The issue of what state controls the Northern sea has led the Government of Russia to want to delimit maritime zones in the Arctic Ocean and provide a Russian presence on the Spitsbergen archipelago (see figure 1). The Russian Government sees control of the sea and air routes as mutually beneficial. It is in the strategic interests of every Arctic State to have a presence in the Arctic Ocean such as Svalbard Archipelago (see figure 1) since it is the northern geographic location in the Arctic Ocean. The Russian *Arctic Development Strategy 2020*, approved by President Vladimir Putin on 20 February 2013,⁵⁸ identifies several goals. One is the creation of a general purpose Joint Task Force (JTF) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other militarized formations. These include elements of Federal Security Service, Civil Defense (or Disaster Management), Border control agencies located in the Russian Arctic. This JTF is to be capable of ensuring security in different military-political situations.⁵⁹ The JTF is to be established by 2015. As of 2013, this task is almost already accomplished due to reinforcing the North Fleet organization with one mechanized infantry brigade (first Arctic brigade). In just five years the Russian government has already created a functioning system of the Arctic Federal Security Service Coast Guard and improved interaction with border control services of neighboring countries, including cooperation in combating terrorism at sea, smuggling, and illegal migration, as well as protection of

⁵⁸Vladimir Putin, *The Arctic Development Strategy 2020*, Russian Federation Government, 26 February 2013, <http://xn--80aealotwbjpid2k.xn--p1ai/docs/22846/> (accessed 19 May 2013).

⁵⁹Russian Federation National Security Council, 6.

aquatic biological resources. Another important security goal listed in the *Arctic Development Strategy 2020* (ADS 2020) is to optimize the system for monitoring of the Arctic including the border crossing points of Russia. Also the introduction of a special regime of border zones within the Arctic administrative-territories entities with the technical monitoring of torrential zones, creeks, rivers and bays along the Northern sea route. Finally, conduct training of border authorities in line with the nature of the possible threats and challenges in the Arctic.⁶⁰

The timeline found in ADM 2020 for implementation of these strategic objectives is divided into three phases. Phase One, 2008-2010, involved conducting geological-geophysical, hydrographic, cartographic and other studies on developing materials to support the demarcation of Russian Arctic boundaries. Phase Two, 2011-2015, involves developing and coordinating an international legal regime that defines the outer border of the Russian Arctic and recognizes by the United Nations. Phase Three, 2015-2020, would involve the Russian Arctic zone being the leading strategic resource base for oil, natural gas, and minerals for Russian Federation. Russian State Policy over the Arctic region provides all fundamental objectives for understanding the national strategic objectives of the Russian Federation.

The president of the Russian Federation issued in February 2013 a guidance to establish military control in the Arctic by rebuilding its coastal defense infrastructure and improving its technology capabilities. The other Arctic states see Russia's government actions as provocative and controversial. Also, the actions of the Government of Russian Federation exacerbating tensions in the region by firing cruise missiles over the Arctic in

⁶⁰Vladimir Putin, *The Arctic Development Strategy 2020*.

an exercise in the summer of 2007. The reinforcement of Northern Fleet in the summer of 2008, in order to perform additional exercises; tested new electronic equipment and precision weapons; and resumed Arctic patrols for the first time since the end of the Cold War was also controversial. As an indicator of increased Russian activity, several times during the past two years U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) jets have even shadowed Russian bombers close to the Norwegian and Alaskan coasts, particularly during and after the Georgia-Russia conflict in August 2008.⁶¹ The current strategy on development of Arctic territories and security issues 2020 does contain specific information related to regional security and evaluation of the possible threats and hazards in the Arctic.

⁶¹Conley and Kraut, 25.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter 2 reviewed the existing literature on the security aspects of the Arctic region primarily from the Russian Federation and the U.S. governments. A number of documents in chapter 2 define the major political and security objectives of the key countries in the region in order to maintain homeland security, provide economic support for the local population, and develop capabilities for the use of new sea routes around Europe.

Chapter 3 will provide a basic explanation of the methodology used to answer the primary research question: How does the Russian Federation develop tactical level military capabilities to support its strategic interests in the Arctic region? In order to answer the primary research question, the following secondary questions need to be addressed: What types of tactical level ground capabilities exist to support Russian military interests in the European Arctic? What resources and capabilities are required to establish and maintain control over specific Arctic regions? How are Russian tactical level military leaders managing training activities to maintain an essential pool of force, based on environmental specifications and mission requirements? This chapter will identify the type of research, methods used to answer each secondary research question, and how these answers will assist in answering the primary research question.

Type of Research

The Qualitative Research method will be utilized for this thesis. The emphasis will be on the analysis of the different forms of military capabilities of the Russian tactical level formations located in the Arctic region that support the activity of the Russian Northern Fleet. The qualitative research will use Army Functional Solutions Analysis⁶² as a model to answer the primary research question, and to identify and evaluate the relevance of the existing doctrine, status of training and combat readiness, and manpower capability of the ground elements.

Research Design

The research design will assist in evaluating the Russian Navy Northern Command Group (RNNCG) ground component located in Kola Peninsula, the Russian northwestern border with Norway and Finland (see figure 1). The design is based on a description and analysis of specific criterion (doctrine, organization, leadership and education) that contain a number of indicators. These factors will act as evaluation criteria for an assessment of the military capabilities in chapter 5.

⁶²Functional solutions analysis (FSA) evaluates solutions from an operational perspective across the DOTMLPF spectrum. The FSA results in a list of potential need-based solutions and is further divided into three subcomponents: non-material analysis (DOT_LPF), material solutions (ideas for material approaches, or IMA, analysis) and the Analysis of Material Approaches to determine the best materiel or combination of approaches to produce the best capability. Official Homepage of Functional Area 50, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS),” www.fa50.army.mil/.../3170%20DAU%20Brief%2010%20Jul%2003 (accessed 10 March 2013).

Setting and Participants

The primary focus of this research is the ground component of the RNNCG: the 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Marines) and 200th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (one of the Arctic Brigades). Both units play a significant role in the homeland defense concept of the Russian Federation. These units were designed to support naval elements in maintaining military presence in the “Russian Arctic.” Their existing and preplanned military capabilities will create a comprehensive image of the current military situation in the Kola Peninsula of the Arctic region. In addition, this project will assist the USARAK in understanding the possible threats and challenges presented by Russian military elements. That understanding will help to determine the minimum capability for an adequate presence in the region for the U.S. military.

Procedure

The overall procedure will be conducted in accordance with the Functional Solution Analysis evaluation criterion of the “doctrine,” “organization,” “training,” “leadership and education,” and “personnel.” The main criterion and subordinate indicators will be used as follows:

The “doctrine” analysis will examine existing doctrine of the Russian Federation on the conduct of operations in the Arctic region (or winter warfare); the way the military fights its conflicts with emphasis on maneuver warfare and combined air-ground campaigns. Indicator 1: Is the existing doctrine in the domain of the combined arms maneuver complete? Indicator 2: Are there operating procedures established; and do they contribute to the identified needs? Indicator 3: Do the command, control, communication, and information systems (C3IS) support the doctrine?

The “organization” analysis will generally be an overview of the task organization of the infantry and naval infantry brigades. Indicator 1: Do the organizational structures meet the needs? Indicator 2: Is the organization properly staffed and funded to deal with the missions? If so, how do they manage organizational issues?

The “training” analysis will be an overview of how senior leaders of the Russian military prepare forces to fight in the Arctic environment. Indicator 1: Does the training meet the needs of mission requirements? Indicator 2: Can improvements be made to offset capability gaps in basic and advanced individual training, various types of unit training, joint exercises, and other training? Indicator 3: What possible regional scenarios exist?

The “leadership and education” analysis will be a general overview of how we prepare our leaders (from battalion to brigade commander) to direct the fight in the Arctic environment, and their overall professional development. Indicator 1: Are leaders at all levels prepared? Indicator 2: Does the leadership have enough resources to support leader’s education and training?

The “personnel” analysis will be a broad overview of the availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations to support a capability gap with restructuring. Indicator 1: Is there an adequate number of personnel? Indicator 2: Are there qualified and trained personnel in the correct occupational specialties at the right place?

The aforementioned criteria will assist in answering the secondary research questions. The initial secondary question is: What types of tactical level ground capabilities exist to support Russian military interests in the Arctic? The main criteria

which will assist in answering this question will be doctrine, organization, leadership and education. This section will examine existing Russian military doctrine on conducting operations in the Arctic region (winter warfare); the way the military fights its conflicts with emphasis on maneuver warfare and combined air-ground campaigns. Next there will be an overview of how forces are organized to fight: task organization of the infantry and naval infantry brigades. Lastly, a leadership analysis will be conducted to provide an overview of leader education and training necessary to lead the fight in the Arctic environment, and their future professional development. All these elements will fill the information gap related to the existing Russian military capability in the Arctic.

The next secondary research question is: What human resources are required to establish and maintain control over specific Arctic regions? This is particularly important during establishment of littoral security areas and international border with Norway and Finland. This will be based on the analysis of “personnel” criterion. This section will be an overview of existing manpower capabilities for ground components to conduct operations effectively. A broad overview of the availability of qualified personnel will be conducted, based on peacetime requirements and the mobilization process for contingency operations.

The final secondary question is: How are the Russian tactical level military leaders managing training activities to maintain an essential pool of force, based on environmental specifications and mission requirements? The answer will be based on the analysis of criterion such as training, leadership and education. It will also emphasize the description of the current operational environment and future opportunities for the establishment of a military relationship in the domain of Arctic security, etc.

Conclusions

A clear and complete description of the specific steps to be followed during the research was provided. The emphasis was on the mechanisms which will be used to answer the primary and secondary research questions. Also, a general description was given of all criteria and indicators used to support the main research question. Chapter 4 will answer the secondary research questions, provide details necessary for the reader to understand the overall situation, and set the stage for the primary research question to be answered.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The danger of the militarization of the Arctic persists.⁶³
– Vladimir Putin, Meeting at the Russian Defense Ministry

Introduction

Chapter 3 described the mechanisms that will be used to answer primary and secondary research questions. It established basic criteria and indicators for evaluating principles of the Functional Solutions Analysis in DOTMLPF spectrum using doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, and personnel. In order to create a comprehensive picture of the RNNCG ground elements, some DOTMLPF criteria will be combined to answer the secondary research questions. In addition, some applicable aspects of the Arctic operational environment and emphasis on Russian strategic interests will be mentioned to support the primary research question. This chapter is designed to provide effective informational support to the secondary research questions and offer a general description and analysis using previously established mechanisms. Each secondary question will be supported by some criterion of the DOTMLPF spectrum; those using previously created evaluation indicators will assess and analyze information provided. The indicator is a generic question based on the principles of Functional Solutions Analysis and is used to evaluate multiple domains of a regular military

⁶³Vladimir Baranov, “The Danger of the Militarization of the Arctic Persists—Putin, The Russian Arctic,” RIA Novosti, 28 February 2013, <http://arctic.ru/news/2013/02/danger-militarization-arctic-persists-putin> (accessed 9 April 2013).

organization. Current research indicators are oriented to best describe and evaluate the problem.

By the end of the Cold War, the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union over the Arctic region reduced significantly. Also, political perspectives have changed and interests in the Arctic region have been minimized. The 21st century scientific discoveries in the Arctic of natural resources, northern sea lines of communications, and continuous political disputes over the political boundaries, contributed to international attention. The U.S., as a key member of NATO, could not ignore disputes over the Arctic for two reasons. First, because of the growing Russian Federation military and political posturing in the Arctic. Second, because Canada, Norway and Denmark (with Greenland as an autonomous Danish dependent territory) still play-an important role in the North-American continental security system. As previously described, the Russian military activity in the Arctic region has raised the level of international attention. Creation of the Arctic brigades as a subordinate element of the RNNCG in Kola Peninsula increased the interests of the political leaders in their missions and military capabilities. The significant importance of the RNNCG is demonstrated through an exclusive command and control structure, a specific task organization that has a ground component, and is based on the newly created concept of the “Arctic brigades.” The concept of “Arctic brigades” is based on the formation of specialized units, specifically designed to conduct combat operations in the Arctic environment.

Initial efforts of the Russian militarization of the Arctic were theoretical and were to be accomplished in 2015 with the creation of two Arctic mechanized infantry brigades, to be located separately in Murmansk and Archangelsk. However, exceeding

expectations, on 6 December 2012, the first Arctic brigade was created based on the 200th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (200 MIB), and subsequently became a part of the RNNCG Ground Task Force. Another element of the Ground Task Force is the 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (61 SNIB). Both units have different capabilities, which will be described later, and are assigned in different missions within the Arctic.

Russian Tactical Level Ground Capabilities in the European Arctic

The main criterion which will assist in answering this part of the research will be the relevance of the military doctrine, organization, leadership and education, criteria of DOTMLPF. First, there will be an examination of existing Russian military doctrine and a concentration on some aspects of conducting military operations in the Arctic region. Then, there will be an overview of how the RNNCG Ground Task Force is organized to fight. Lastly, a leadership analysis will be conducted to provide an overview of leader education and training (battalion – brigade leadership) necessary to lead the fight in the Arctic environment, and their future professional development. All of these elements will fill the information gap related to the existing Russian military capability in the Arctic.

Completeness of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation in Domain of Combined Arms Maneuvers in the Arctic Environment

Russian Federation political-military activity is oriented on two perspectives. One is a tendency to develop good relationships with the U.S. and NATO. The other is to consider the North Atlantic Alliance activity as a threat to Russian homeland security. Signed by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on 5 February 2010, new *Military*

*Doctrine of the Russian Federation*⁶⁴ mentioned both of these. Some important aspects of the Russian Federation's military policy are determined by the President of the Russian Federation in accordance with federal legislation, *National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020*, and emphasized in Russian Federation Military Doctrine (RFMD):

The Russian Federation's military policy is aimed at preventing an arms race, deterring and preventing military conflicts, and improving military organization, the forms and methods of the utilization of the Armed Forces and other troops, and also means of attack for the purpose of defending and safeguarding the security of the Russian Federation and also the interests of its allies.⁶⁵

An important part of this paragraph is the statement “the forms and methods of the utilization of the Armed Forces and other troops” that emphasizes an overview of the legitimate use of force in cases stipulated by current military policy. In addition, RFMD chapter 2 described military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation, with a comprehensive description of the external, where NATO is first in the list, and internal security threats. That statement is an important point in the research due to NATO and the Partnership for Peace program member states (Norway, and Finland) that have a political boundary with the Russian Federation in the Arctic region. The RFMD indirectly specified some aspects of the use of force in relation to territorial claims against the Russian Federation that can be tied to the disputes over the Arctic political boundaries.

⁶⁴Vladimir Putin, *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* (Moscow, Russia: President of the Russian Federation, 5 February 2010), www.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461 (accessed 10 April 2013).

⁶⁵Military Policy-the activity of the state to organize and effect defense and safeguard the security of the Russian Federation and also the interests of its allies. Vladimir Putin, *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, 2.

The aforementioned strategic documents do not describe regional aspects, in this case, security aspects of the Arctic region. Nevertheless, strategic direction over peacetime activity of the Russian Navy is identified as:

1. Guarantee strategic deterrence, including the prevention of military conflicts;
2. Sustain the capability of the Armed Forces and other troops for the timely deployment of groupings of troops (forces) in potentially dangerous strategic strike, and to maintain their readiness for combat use;
3. Protect important state and military facilities, lines of communication, and special cargoes;
4. Combat piracy and ensure safety shipping;
5. Ensure the security of the economic activity of the R.F. in the high seas;
6. Prepare for carrying out territorial defense and civil defense measures.⁶⁶

The naval objectives mentioned in RFMD were reiterated in *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020* (MDRF 2020), approved by President Vladimir Putin on 27 July 2001 (order no. 1387). The MDRF 2020 became a fundamental document defining the public policy of the Russian Federation in the field of maritime activities - a national marine policy of the Russian Federation. The legal basis of maritime doctrine is centered on the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws and other regulatory legal acts, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, and other international treaties in the field of maritime activity, the use of space resources and the oceans. The Maritime Doctrine reflects ideas of the establishment of specific force packages in different maritime regions, capable of supporting regional civil and military naval activities, by combining military and special services elements: the

⁶⁶Vladimir Putin, *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, para. 27, 9.

Navy, Maritime Border Guard of the Federal Security Service, and the civilian maritime fleet for mobilization purposes.⁶⁷

The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020 in the Arctic is based on principles of the MDRF 2020 and encompasses naval freedom of navigation in the Atlantic, and security of the Russian economic areas and the Russian continental shelf. To achieve this, the Russian Northern Fleet plays a crucial role in supporting naval strategic interests in territorial security and increasing the importance of the Northern Sea Route for sustainable economic development of the Russian Federation. The RNNCG represents an operational-strategic level of command composed of the following branches: submarine forces, surface forces, naval air force, marines and coastal defense troops. The main headquarters is located in Severomorsk, Murmansk Oblast. Beginning on 6 December 2012, the RNNCG had one mechanized infantry brigade (200 MIB). In total, by the end of 2012, the ground component of the RNNCG consists of the units shown in table 1.

⁶⁷Vladimir Putin, *The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020* (Moscow, Russia: President of the Russian Federation, 27 July 2001), <http://2004.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2001/07/58035.shtml> (accessed 10 April 2013), ch. 1, 2.

Table 1. Russian Northern Naval Command Group
Ground Component

Name	Native Abbreviation	Branch	Location
200 th Separate Pechenga Mechanized Infantry Brigade	200 омсбр	Mechanized Infantry	Pechenga
61 st Separate Kirkenes Naval Infantry Brigade (Sputnik)	61 обрмп	Naval Infantry	Sputnik
313 th Separate Counter Sabotage Forces Detachment	313 ООБ ПДСС	Naval Special Purpose Force	Sputnik
160 th Separate Counter Sabotage Forces Detachment	160 ООБ ПДСС	Naval Special Purpose Force	Vidyaevo
269 th Separate Counter Sabotage Forces Detachment	269 ООБ ПДСС	Naval Special Purpose Force	Gadzhievo
420 th Separate Naval Surveillance Point	420 мрп	Naval Reconnaissance Force	Polyarny
Mobile Communication Node	ПУС	Signal	Polyarny
536 th Separate Coastal Propelled Artillery Brigade	536 обрб	Coastal Artillery	Sneznogorsk
180 th Separate Naval Engineers Battalion	180 омиб	Engineers	Severomorsk
215 th Electronic Warfare Regiment	215 прб	Electronic Warfare	Severomorsk
516 th Communication Node	516 узел связи	Signal	Severomorsk

Source: Created by author based on Russian Fleet, “Northern Fleet Organizational Structure,” <http://flot.com/nowadays/structure/north/> (accessed 19 May 2013); Independent Informational Portal of the Northern Fleet, “Fleet’s Structure,” http://severnyflot.ru/add/forum/forum_viewtopic.php?1634.post (accessed 19 May 2013); Military Districts Maps, “Leningrad Military District, Baltic and Northern Fleets,” http://www.tipologic.narod.ru/doc_carta_lenvo.htm (accessed 19 May 2013).

According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, “Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each arm was used separately or sequentially.”⁶⁸ As described above in 2001, Russian senior naval leaders initiated development of an updated version of organizational structure for the Russian Northern Fleet, introducing a

⁶⁸Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 16 May 2012), 1-14.

mechanized infantry brigade in its task organization. This was done to support RNNCG in maintaining presence of ground elements in the vicinity of the Norwegian and Finnish border, and released the naval infantry unit from land operations. Russian military leaders realized the necessity of another group combat element that was capable of monitoring and evaluating the regional situation, as well as the ability to become part of the quick reaction force element of the RNNCG. The units represented in figure 1 are members of the RNNCG Ground Task Force, capable of planning (supporting) and executing maritime (naval support) and land operations (support of the infantry brigades).

The concept of combined arms maneuver is to apply the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy, to seize and exploit initiative.⁶⁹ Russian military doctrine at the operational level focused on a type of combined arms maneuver called Combined Arms Battle.⁷⁰

Combined arms battle forms the basis of the Russian army during decisive action, as well as during other types of joint (airborne, anti-airborne) military operations. It is conducted through the combined efforts of the various branches of the Armed Forces, Army Special Forces, Air Force and Air Defense Forces, and involves the Navy during seaside areas of operation. Modern combined arms battle is characterized by a rapid change of the situation in the battlefield, high tension, short and dynamic air–ground oriented, with the application of various methods of tactical tasks, and a complex

⁶⁹Ibid., 1-14.

⁷⁰Russian Federation General Staff Land Component Command, *Battlefield Manual for Preparation and Execution of Combined Arms Battle, Battalion (Company), part. II* (Moscow, Russia: Defense Ministry, 2005), 5.

electronic warfare situation.⁷¹ In accordance with military doctrine, the Arctic operational environment will significantly influence the organization and execution of decisive action.

In accordance with author's analysis, the Arctic restricted terrain with a large number of swamps, lakes, high grounds, and other impassable areas will contribute to faster development of defensive positions than under normal terrain conditions. The Russian military concept of conducting defensive operations in the Arctic is terrain oriented, using wide front, accessible avenues of approach, and company-battalion level fortified positions connected in a chain of defensive positions. The main efforts are focused on keeping control over land communication networks and surrounding heights, local settlements, bridges, and other important objectives. Defensive positions will be established on high ground. Intervals between battalions and companies will be larger than in regular conditions, these will be covered using obstacles, ambushes, and patrols. Offensive operations in the Arctic are mostly oriented on defeating the enemy in position, disrupting his ability to maneuver using severity of the terrain, and seizing key terrain and infrastructure. Relevance of military doctrine is proved through the assignment of strategic level to tactical level military objectives for every branch and further development of operational and tactical level documents to support higher echelon objectives, supported by flexible and adaptable task organization.

⁷¹Russian Federation General Staff Land Component Command, 5.

Standard Operating Procedures Used at the Operational and Tactical Levels

According to U.S. DoD military dictionary: “Standard operating procedures (SOP) are the set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness.” The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise.⁷² General understanding of the SOP is related to a detailed explanation of how a policy (in our case MDRF) is to be implemented. The SOP may appear on the same form as a policy, or it may appear in a separate document. The main difference between an SOP and a policy are details. In accordance with Russian military policy, the smallest tactical level unit is considered to be brigade and regiment. An effective SOP communicates who performs the task, what materials are necessary, where the task will take place, when the task shall be performed, and how the unit will execute the task; in addition, individual scenarios for different situations may apply. Russian military SOPs at the tactical level are based on the Soviet planning system with some updates related to the use of modern technological equipment (command, control, communication, and information systems).⁷³ The details in Russian SOPs are designed to standardize the process and provide step-by-step how-to instructions that enable commanders at all levels beyond brigade to perform mission tasks in a consistent manner.

⁷²Joint Education and Doctrine Division J-7 Joint Staff, “Standard Operating Procedures,” http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/s/7203.html (accessed 13 April 2013).

⁷³Alexei Hlopotov, “Программно-технические комплексы АСУ ТЗ Созвездие-2М,” Army Messenger, October 2011, <http://army-news.ru/2011/10/kompleksy-asu-tz-sozvezdie-2m/> (accessed 20 May 2013).

The Russian tactical level SOP consists of multiple documents and regulations that direct unit activities during peace and wartime in order to achieve cohesion at the operational level. Author's analysis illustrates estimated list of supporting tactical SOP documents is:

1. Guidance for operational level planning for current fiscal year: this depicts strategic and operational objectives in which a unit takes part during current fiscal year with clearly identified tasks, financial support, and accomplishment report system, usually received from the higher headquarters operations department.
2. Guidance for troop's education and training:⁷⁴ this consists of a number of specific training objectives to be accomplished during this year, number of platoon - to - battalion level exercises, financial expenses for every training activity, specifics of leadership training, objectives for branches' training (engineers, fires, sustainment, communications), number of hours dedicated for leadership and social disciplines (ethics, military- political education etc.).
3. Logistics instructions for current fiscal years: this is an important document that specifies all details related to troop logistics, maintenance of the weapons and equipment systems, main sustainment activities in the unit's calendar, medical support and other, received from the higher headquarters logistics department.

⁷⁴Nikolay D. Frolov, Mihail F. Semenov, and Leonid A. Charchevich, "Recommendations and Methodology for Combat Training and Commanders Development Organization in Units and Formations," <http://window.edu.ru/library/pdf2txt/000/22000/5213> (accessed 19 May 2013).

4. Branches (services) Combat and Field Manuals: are unclassified and classified documents that provide detailed explanations of units' actions in different missions and situations based on principles of combined arms battle. These are distributed by higher echelon, and developed for squad to brigade level, in addition specific instructions for individual activity are developed (ex. Soldiers, motorized sections (tank) actions in battle).⁷⁵
5. Combat Readiness Escalation Plan: key document depicting mechanisms of increasing combat readiness by fulfilling personnel and equipment gaps, synchronization and coordination measures with recruiting stations, and other. This is created once a unit's task organization is established, and it is updated monthly.
6. Mobilization Plan:⁷⁶ top priority document to prepare units from peace to war time, consists of a number of relevant documents for personnel, equipment, and resources management.
7. Regional Situational Scenarios (RSS): these scenarios comprise everything related to specific situation elements from the above mentioned documents and create a synchronized algorithm of effective actions.

⁷⁵I. M. Platkhin, *Soldier, Motorized Section' (Tank) Actions in Battle*, Kamchat Technical State University, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky City, 2007, window.edu.ru/resource/872/69872/files/kamchatgtu236.pdf (accessed 10 April 2013).

⁷⁶Russian Federal Service for Military Technical Cooperation, *Mobilization Training and Civil Defense*, 26 February 1997, <http://www.fsvts.gov.ru/materials/2DE16DE19DC20B7544257B0A001D48A2.html> (accessed 15 April 2013).

RSS⁷⁷ is a comprehensive document, developed by the staff of the brigade, approved by higher headquarters. The document can be updated depending on the situation, but in most cases it has the following permanent structure:

1. Introduction: depicts overall created situation (potential challenge).
2. Unit's role: describes mission for every estimated situation, mode of action; independent or as part of the task force.
3. Unit's tasks: describes preventive tasks during mission accomplishment.
4. Synchronization efforts: represents coordination and synchronization of all maneuver elements during mission accomplishment in relation to time and space.
5. Logistic support: describes troops' sustainment mechanisms after 72 hours.
6. Command and Control: depicts command relationship and control measures, communication and signal procedures, radio frequencies shift from main to reserve.
7. Commander's location: indicates the location of the main and reserve command posts and commander's replacement.

Some RSS are related to specific missions and objectives in support of higher commander's intent and operational environment. The brigade staff should be capable of

⁷⁷Note by Author: RSS concept is based on multiple sources evaluated during project development. These are based on information provided for military exercises such as: "Zapad-2013," Russia–Belarus bilateral exercise based on scenario of state borders enforcements; "Vzaimodeistvie–2012," Russia–Armenia bilateral exercise based on bilateral cooperation and collective defense scenarios; Natural Disaster Consequences Management Exercises, conducted with Civil Defense Federal Agency; and Joint Antiterrorist Action exercises, conducted with Federal Security Service and other federal agencies.

developing scenarios based on higher headquarters' guidance, regional specifications, and resources estimated for the possible missions, and level of adequate troop support necessary for self-sustainment for 72 hours only. Several experts on the region and the author's experience and continuous monitoring of military activities in the Arctic region, estimated scenarios are considered:

1. Antiterrorism action:⁷⁸ describes unit's role, capability of combat ready status units to operate in regional level antiterrorism operations, to support local governance in managing situations by conducting a third-fourth outer cordon, as well support with capabilities for combat service support units (communication, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance, counter improvised explosive device activity), and logistic capabilities.
2. Natural and industrial incident:⁷⁹ describes unit's role in case of natural or technological disaster, in domain of assistance of civil authorities with existing capabilities. In case of natural disasters: evacuation, isolation, law enforcement. In case of technological disaster: reconnaissance (CBRN), engineer support, transportation, isolation, evacuation, basic medical treatment and shelter.

⁷⁸Olga Vorobiova, "Antiterror in High North," *Red Star*, 1 April 2013, <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/news-menu/vesti/iz-vmf/severnyj-flot/item/8343-antiterror-na-krajnem-severe> (accessed 1 May 2013). Describes possible scenario of "Antiterrorism action" in the Arctic region.

⁷⁹Murmansk Messenger, "Murmansk Oblast Participate in State Level Consequences Management Exercise," 24 April 2013, <http://www.mvestnik.ru/shwpgn.asp?pid=2013042336> (accessed 19 May 2013). Describes possible "Natural and industrial incident" scenario in the Arctic region.

3. Airspace management:⁸⁰ describes procedures to be conducted in case of violation of Russian airspace, detection, reporting mechanisms, combat reaction in case of necessity, in addition establishes relationship with border and civilian airspace control agencies.
4. State border reinforcement:⁸¹ reinforcement of the Border Control Agency with existing military capabilities along state border with Norway, Finland, and Sweden. Coordination measures with regional elements of the Federal Security Service, local authorities, troop's sustainment.
5. Base security: describes unit's defensive measures on unexpected attack of the garrison, describes coordination measures between the units on guard, battalions, and other formations to react and achieve effective control over situation, secure main command post, and coordination of efforts with local law enforcement agency.
6. Partial mobilization: consists of documents and activities in order to conduct partial mobilization for special purposes such as reservists training, filling personnel gaps to support of civil authorities, to set conditions for full mobilization process.

⁸⁰Andrey Ghavrilenko, "Flights in the Arctic Sky," *Red Star*, 15 February 2013, <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/news-menu/vesti/iz-vmf/severnyj-flot/item/7536-poljoty-v-arkticheskikh-shirotax> (accessed 19 May 2013). Describes possible "Airspace violation" scenario in the Arctic region.

⁸¹Elena Dmitrieva, "Russian-Norwegian Exercise moved from Barents to Norwegian Sea," *Federal Press*, 14 May 2013, http://fedpress.ru/news/polit_vlast/news_polit/1368525294-rossiisko-norvezhskie-ucheniya-pomor-2013-peremestilis-iz-barentseva-v-norvezhskoe-more (accessed 19 May 2013). Describes possible "State border reinforcement" scenario in the Arctic region.

7. Civil support: relatively new concept for the RNNCG designed to support civilian organization efforts in infrastructure development of the Arctic region. It consists of logistical support and security for scientific expeditions, air and ground reconnaissance and surveillance, weather updates and geographical features.
8. Support to the force:⁸² describes mechanism and measures included to support other elements of the Russian Arctic security system. It consists of coordination and cooperation plans and activities in order to achieve coherent level of interoperability during different mission tasks. Coordination is executed mostly with local law enforcement agency, Federal Security Service (FSS), Border Control Service of the FSS, regional element of the Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Elimination of Consequences of natural disasters.

The aforementioned scenarios encompass tactical level SOP for the ground component of the RNNCG. These are designed to achieve a level of readiness and interoperability between military formations and security elements of the governmental authorities in complex situations. The Russian tactical level standard operating procedure described through RSS is capable of covering doctrinal needs and achieving coherent reaction to different situations. These scenarios permit them to maintain an essential pool

⁸²Public Information Office of the Western Military District, “Personnel of the Naval Infantry and Separate Mechanized Brigades are Training for Combined Landing Exercise,” Fedpress.ru, 13 March 2013, http://fedpress.ru/news/polit_vlast/news_polit/1368525294-rossiisko-norvezhskie-ucheniya-pomor-2013-peremestilis-iz-barentseva-v-norvezhskoe-more (accessed 19 May 2013). Describes possible “Support to the force” scenario in the Arctic region.

of force in the Arctic region that is able provide minimum reaction to unexpected events and incidents, support the local population in case of natural disasters, or monitor Russian Federation state border.

How Command, Control, Communication, and Information Systems (C3IS) Support the Military Doctrine?

C3IS of the Russian military still use technological equipment made in the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, no attention was paid to C3IS development due to the transition from being the largest military power to a severely reduced force with low budgeting, and the appearance of internal military conflicts.⁸³ Tendencies to upgrade existing capabilities did not bring any results. Military industry has stopped its production, and unemployment of the experts in the C3IS domain forced them to find other places to work. The leaders of the Russian military were concerned with maintaining existing C3IS capabilities and the nuclear deterrence option in the Arctic.

Tendencies of the Russian military industrial complex to create a joint tactical command and control system demonstrated its financial insufficiency. The cost to equip one regular infantry brigade was estimated at six million dollars. The only improvement was at the strategic and operational levels, where the situation regarding C3IS was much better. The Russian General Staff updated existing capabilities through the use of imported technology, confirming that the Russian industrial complex is limited in creating such systems and software.⁸⁴ A fully modernized Army Command Post is

⁸³Vladimir Popovkin, "Russian Weapons," 10 April 2013, <http://www.arms-expo.ru/049057054048124055054055052.htm> (accessed 19 May 2013).

⁸⁴Viktor Polatvtsev, "New Combat Management System," Newsland, 10 March 2010, <http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/471643/> (accessed 19 May 2013).

designed to conduct permanent activity monitoring in military districts. In addition, every military district is equipped with command and control systems, designed to report the status of forces and main activities to its higher headquarters. Both strategic and operational level command posts are used for other missions such as supporting civil authorities, disaster management, and command post exercises. Secured lines of communication permit exchanging information between headquarters and subordinated commands. However, attempts to continue the C3IS development to the tactical level did not bring any results and sometimes created complications in command and control capabilities between tactical and operational levels.⁸⁵ Arctic brigades are still using Soviet equipment, with little improvements in the computer domain. This affects command and control capability within brigades, as well as information exchange which is maintained through the use of regular telephone and messengers. The doctrinal basis for the development of C3IS capabilities is mostly theoretical. Also, the government and does not have sufficient technological and financial support to create it.

Satellite communication remains a high priority for the Russian signal community. They realize all the advantages of satellite communication systems, but due to lack of satellite capability, Russian signal doctrine is still based on the combined use of air and ground communication systems.⁸⁶ Arctic brigades are not equipped with any

⁸⁵Edward Voitenko, "New Philosophy of Conducting Combat Operations," *Arsenal. Military Technological Review*, no. 1 (January 2010), http://www.sozvezdie.su/news_smi/maingroup/arsenal_voennopromishlennoe_obozrenie/ (accessed 19 May 2013).

⁸⁶Evgheniy Kamnev, Alexander Below, and Vladimir Bobkov, "New Approaches for Constructing Satellite Communication Systems," *Russian Defense Power*, <http://www.mwtelecom.ru/content/72/Oboronnaya%20mosch%20Rossii.pdf> (accessed 19 May 2013).

satellite imagery or satellite communication systems. Another doctrinal aspect of C3IS is based on the development of air reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and the Russian military achieved some advancement in this domain.⁸⁷ The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) systems, developed by the military industrial complex, are the top priority today for the Russian Air Force. Based on bilateral agreements with Israel, Russians are now capable of building their own UAVs, still using foreign technology to equip them. Currently, there is no active UAV capability for the Arctic brigades.⁸⁸

Russian Military Doctrine enforces the development and use of modern C3IS. It recognizes the importance of the joint communication and information systems, and raising criteria for intelligence data gathering and analysis capability. New reforms in the security sector and increased financial expenses for defense needs will push the military industrial complex to develop relationships with international partners, experts in C3IS, in order to achieve modern standards in this domain.

Organization

Decreasing the size of the Russian Armed Forces has significantly affected its capability to react to modern threats and challenges. These declines also affected the Russian Navy. The lack of adequate funding needed for a fleet and the necessary amount of logistics management has forced the Russian navy to reduce their capability. Under

⁸⁷Serghey Uferev, "Perspectives for the Russian UAV's Development," *Military Review* (May 2013), <http://topwar.ru/27673-perspektivy-razvitiya-rossiyskih-bpla.html> (accessed 19 May 2013).

⁸⁸Note by author: It is estimated that Russian Armed Forces will receive first UAV's by the end of 2013. RIA Novosti, "Армия может получить первые малые отечественные БПЛА в 2013 году," September 2012, http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20121009/769887466.html (accessed 19 May 2013).

these circumstances, the importance of the Northern Fleet is significant because it is the only military instrument of political power for the protection of Russian interests in the Arctic region of the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean Seas. There will be a discussion later of whether the organizational structure of the RNNCG addresses their mandated task that includes deterrence options of the use of military force and the threat of use of force against Russia from the northern direction. To answer this question, the operational capability of the Northern Fleet must be analyzed. According to open sources, as of the beginning of 2013, the Northern Fleet capabilities include: 43 submarines, 41 surface ships, 57 fixed wing, and 62 rotary wing aircraft of various purposes. According to Russian military experts such as Dr. Konstantin Sivkov, doctor in military science and first vice-president of the Geopolitical Problem Academy, from 40-70 percent of the Russian naval capability requires reparation and maintenance, and are not mission capable or are partially mission capable.⁸⁹ Because of the estimated capability to rapidly respond to military aggression, the RNNCG wartime capabilities will be based on fully capable equipment and personnel, and are estimated to be as follows:

⁸⁹Dr. Konstantin Sevkov, "Northern Fleet Must Reliably Protect Countries' Interests in the Arctic," *Army News*, <http://army-news.ru/2013/01/severnyj-flot-obyazan-nadyozhno-zashhishhat-interesy-strany-v-arktike/> (accessed 21 April 2013).

Table 2. RNNCG Estimated Wartime Capabilities

Type	Name	Quantity	Mission	NATO classification
<i>Combat ready ships for conducting long range naval operations:</i>				
Heavy aircraft carrying missile cruiser	“Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov”	1	Heavy aircraft carrying missile cruiser	Aircraft Cruiser
Heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser	“Petr Velikiy”	1	Heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser	Heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser
Anti-submarine destroyer	Project 1155	2	Anti-submarine destroyer	Udaloy
<i>Combat ready ships for short-range coastal defense operations:</i>				
Corvettes	“Miraj”	2	Rocket cruiser	Corvette
Anti-submarine corvettes	-	3	Anti-submarine activity	Anti-submarine corvette
Minesweepers	Different types	5	Countermine Ops	Minesweepers
Large Landing ships	Project 775	2	Landing operations	Ropucha
<i>Combat ready submarines for short-range coastal defense operations:</i>				
Cruise missile submarine	SSGN	1	Cruise missile submarine	-
Nuclear multipurpose submarines	NMS	4	NMS	-
Non-nuclear submarines	NNS	3	NNS	-
<i>Combat and combat support aircrafts:</i>				
Carrier-based air defense fighter	SU33	12	Air defense	Flanker- D
Close air support aircraft	SU25	5	Close air support	Frogfoot
Air-surveillance aircraft	TU22MR	3	Air-surveillance	-
Maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircrafts	TU142M	2	Maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare	-
Anti-submarine warfare aircrafts	IL38	5	Anti-submarine warfare	-
Aircraft-re-translators	TU142-MP	2	Signal	-
Anti-submarine helicopters	KA27-PL	10	Anti-submarine	-
Radio surveillance helicopter	KA31	1	Radio surveillance	Helix
Combat-transport helicopters	KA29	10	Combat/transport	Helix-B
Transport helicopter	MI8	14	Transport	-

Source: Created by author based on Dr. Konstantin Sevkov, “The Navy Must Firmly Defend the Country's Interests in the Arctic.” *Military-Technological Courier*, 16 January 2013, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/13977> (accessed 19 May 2013); Russian Military Analysis, “Northern Fleet. Severomorsk,” <http://warfare.be/db/lang/rus/catid/239/linkid/2223/base/855/title/severnnyy-flot/> (accessed May 19, 2013); Wikipedia, “Northern Fleet, Order of Battle,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Fleet#Order_of_battle (accessed 19 May 2013).

According to Dr. Sivkov, from the initial phase of a military conflict, the RNNCG will coordinate their activity with 21st Air Defense (AD) Corps that uses the Joint Air Defense System. Its mission is to cover naval and military bases within the area of responsibility (21 AD Corps consists of two fighter regiments: 60 aircraft (40 mission

ready), plus three AD Regiments equipped with AD complex S-300Ps). In case of a large enemy surface capability, the Northern Fleet will be supported with Long Range Aviation forces, capable of delivering 20 TU-22MZ strategic bombers. In addition, the use of organic land component elements listed in table 2 will establish echeloned coastal defense, involving Arctic brigades, or in case of land operations, will create a Joint Task Force to suppress enemy elements, avoiding state boundary crossings by conducting defense in depth.⁹⁰ Tactical level ground elements of the RNNCG will remain the main ground component of the Northern Fleet that will support littoral and coastal defense operations.

200th Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (200 MIB)

The 200 MIB is the only major mechanized tactical formation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces located in the Arctic. The brigade was created on 1 December 1997 after a reduction of the Armed Forces and based on the 131st Mechanized Division of Leningrad Military Okrug. The brigade's headquarters is located in the vicinity of Pechenga village (previously called Petsamo) of Murmansk Oblast, approximately 10 kilometers from the Russian–Norwegian border (see figure 2). Beginning on 1 December 2012, the brigade officially became part of the Russian Federation Northern Fleet. The brigade's reputation is one of the best in the Russian military and it is considered at the highest level of readiness for combat

⁹⁰Sevkov, "The Navy Must Firmly Defend the Country's Interests in the Arctic."

Table 3. 200 MIB's Task Organization

No.	Unit	Abbreviation	-		
200	Brigade headquarters	BDE HQ	-	Maintenance Battalion	MTBN
583 rd	Separate Motorized Battalion	583 SMBN	-	Reconnaissance & Surveillance Company	RSCO
658 th	Separate Motorized Battalion	658 SMBN	-	CBRN Company	CBRNCO
664 th	Separate Kirkenes Motorized Battalion	664 SM BN	-	Medical Company	MEDCO
60 th	Separate Tank Battalion – Focsani-Gdansk	66 ST BN	293 rd	Separate Electronic Warfare Company	293 SEWCO
416 th	Separate Howitzer Self-propelled Artillery Battalion	416 SPARTY BN	185 th	Frequency Management Station	185FMS
471 st	Separate Howitzer Self-propelled Artillery Battalion	471 SPARTY BN	-	Artillery Fire Control & Reconnaissance Battery	ARTYFCBTY
382 nd	Separate Rocket Artillery Battalion	382 SRARTY BN	-	Separate Military Police Platoon	SMPPL
274 th	Separate Engineer-Supper Battalion	274 SEN BN	-	Separate Intel Platoon	Under C2 of the Brigade Intel Section
871 st	Separate Antitank Artillery Battalion	871 SATARTY BN	-	Separate ADA Platoon	Under C2 of the Brigade ADA Section
226 th	Separate anti-aircraft missile battalion	226 SAD BN	-	Orchestra	
246 th	Separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion	246 SADABN	-	Training Center	
-	Signal Battalion	SIGBN			
-	Sustainment Battalion	SUSBN			

Source: Created by author based on Russian Military Analysis, “Northern Fleet. Severomorsk,” <http://warfare.be/db/lang/rus/catid/239/linkid/2223/base/855/title/severnny-flot/> (accessed 19 May 2013); Wikipedia, “200th Independent Motor Rifle Brigade,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/200th_Independent_Motor_Rifle_Brigade (accessed 19 May 2013); “200 MIB,” Specnaz Published Works Military Forum, <http://specnaz.pbworks.com/w/page/17657939/200%20%D0%BE%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%B1%D1%80> (accessed 19 May 2013).

Table 4. 200 MIB's Main Weapon Systems

Weapons type	Characteristic	Quantity (pcs.)
T-80	Medium Tank	62
MT-LB	Multi-purpose fully amphibious auxiliary armored tracked vehicle	34
MT-LBT	Multi-purpose fully amphibious auxiliary armored tracked vehicle	334
SAU 2S3 “Akatsiya”	152.4 mm self-propelled artillery	36
9P140 “Uragan”	220 mm Self-propelled multiple rocket launcher system	12
BM-21 “Grad”	122 mm Truck-mounted multiple rocket launcher	12

Source: Created by author based on “200 MIB,” Specnaz Published Works Military Forum, <http://specnaz.pbworks.com/w/page/17657939/200%20%D0%BE%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%B1%D1%80> (accessed 19 May 2013); Roman Policarpov Personal Blogs, “Tactical Exercise of the 200th MIB,” <http://polikarpov.info/2012/03/25/1354/> (accessed 19 May 2013); Western Military District, “200 MIB,” Military Forum, <http://www.ofizer.ru/forum/45-91-1> (accessed 19 May 2013).

operations.⁹¹ The brigade consists of separate formations (separate companies and battalions) under one chain of command that forms a Brigade Combat Team type formation that is capable of conducting different types of missions.

The total number of personnel for the entire brigade during peacetime does not exceed 1,200. One company within battalion and one platoon within company (except R&S CO) are in permanent combat readiness.⁹² The rest of the units are manned with personnel only during the mobilization process. The RNNCG takes mobilization training seriously. After establishing good cooperation with the federal authorities in regards to mobilization resources, the brigade staff conducts reservist training every 90 days with about 250 reservists for a two-week period.

The 200MIB is to maintain military presence in the Kola Peninsula (assigned area of responsibility) in order to establish cooperation and coordination of efforts with other ground element components of the RNNCG and state security agencies. It also conducts and rehearses mobilization processes in order to achieve the brigade's rapid transition from permanent to higher combat readiness; support regional governance in patriotic education of younger generation.

Permanent media attention to the brigade's activity led the Russian Federation General Staff and regional command to increase spending on its combat readiness, training, and equipment maintenance. The annual analysis of the combat training and

⁹¹Olga Vorobieva, "Arctic Landmarks of the Northern Fleet," *Red Star*, December 2012, <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/1812/item/6343-zapolyarnye-orientiryi-severnogo-flota> (accessed 16 May 2013).

⁹²Olga Vorobieva, "On the Hills of Arctic," *Red Star*, May 2012, <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/component/k2/item/2479-na-sopkah-zapolyarya> (accessed 16 May 2013).

readiness between the separate brigades in the Russian military demonstrated that the 200 MIB was the most trained formation in 2012.⁹³ The leaders of the brigade are trained to maintain a “high level” of readiness and bring “positive” results of its activity in order to satisfy higher headquarters; nonetheless these results are only on paper. Flexibility is a main problem during mission accomplishment. Personnel are trained to execute the same exercises every training year. These are altered only by some modifications in exercise scenario (terrain and tasks). Leadership skills and the education level of the officer corps in this brigade are insufficient to manage conscripted personnel. This is evidenced by the problems with discipline, behavior, ethnical tensions, desertion, and even homicide that are frequent and still persist. The brigade’s organizational issues are managed through permanent rigorous control from representatives of higher headquarters, the inspector general’s office, and military law enforcement agencies.⁹⁴

The Pechenga mechanized infantry brigade represents one of the best infantry formations in the Russian military. Different aspects related to location, living conditions, permanent attention from higher headquarters, and financial aspects supporting the maintenance of combat readiness, make it an important Russian military security element of the Arctic region. However, organizational problems in human resources management negatively affect the brigade’s readiness.⁹⁵

⁹³Vorobieva, “On the Hills of Arctic.”

⁹⁴Pechenga Rayon, “In the Pechenga Again Hazing ‘Brothers’ from the Caucasus,” May 2013, <http://www.blog.i-balans.ru/в-печенге-опять-дедовщина-«братья»-с-к> (accessed 20 May 2013).

⁹⁵Ibid.

61st Separate Kirkenes Naval Infantry Regiment (Sputnik) (61SKNIR)

The Naval Infantry Corps plays a significant role in the security system of the Russian Federation. It is an elite small force in the Russian military that includes a division in the Pacific Fleet (equivalent to U.S Marine Expeditionary Unit), the detached brigades in the Northern and Baltic Fleets, the Caspian Military Flotilla, and the detached regiment of the Black Sea Fleet. SPUTNIK (see figure 2) is the name of the Arctic Ocean Northern Fleet Marine Main Naval Base, located 140 kilometers north of Murmansk, and seven kilometers east of Pechenga (location of 200 MIB). The 61 SKNIR was created on 1 December 2009 when the Russian Federation Defense Ministry directive dismissed the Kirkenes Red Banner Naval Infantry Brigade and transformed it into the Northern Fleet's 61SKNIR. Together with the 136th Coastal Artillery Brigade, 61 SKNIR is organizationally a part of the Northern Fleet's coastal defense forces.⁹⁶

Similar in mission to the U.S. Marine Corps, the Russian Naval Infantry is a small force, numbering 12,000 personnel, and according to Global Security Organization⁹⁷ data, is the tenth largest in the world. Organizationally, a Naval Infantry Regiment is attached to every major Russian fleet. The doctrine of the naval infantry consists of conducting rapid assault, seizing of coastal objectives in order to be followed by the ground forces. The regular naval infantry regiment has limitations in combat power and logistics support. It is capable of conducting major operations for only one week, and is unable to support itself in major conflicts. Without support, the naval infantry is limited

⁹⁶Global Security, "Description of Land and Coastal Troops of the Navy," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mp.htm> (accessed 23 April 2013).

⁹⁷Ibid.

to conducting small-scale spoiling attacks and limited objective attacks. The basic combat capabilities of one naval regiment is equivalent to a U.S. Marine expeditionary unit that has a reinforced rifle battalion as the main ground element of combat power. The overall size of the Russian naval infantry corps can be compared to a U.S. Marine Infantry Division without reinforcement.

The primary wartime mission of Naval Infantry consists of conducting amphibious and/or airborne landing operations. These operations are characterized in accordance with strategic, operational, and tactical level objectives. Naval Infantry units can also conduct special operations such as reconnaissance and sabotage landings. Secondary missions consist of coastal defense, contributing to regional security, and cooperation with other forces and organizations. The Naval infantry peacetime mission consists of conducting a demonstration of forces in order to support the political-military instrument of the Russian Government. This is conducted through deployment of naval infantry units abroad, assisting Russian naval detachments to patrol international waters, and conducting counter piracy missions.

The regiment is considered to be the most combat effective unit within the Naval Infantry Corps. The active involvement of the 61 SKINR units in combat operations in the first and second Chechnya campaigns demonstrated combat experience and the toughness of the naval infantry personnel. Successful operational accomplishments, conducted by SKNIR units, proved the reputation of “Black berets” as the most

professional military elements in the Russian navy.⁹⁸ Experience gained in combat was reflected in reforms of training doctrine and the task organization of the 61 SKNIR. Combat experience gained in the Caucasus Mountains shaped the future employment of naval infantry units as an expeditionary component of the Northern Fleet missions in international waters, and also formed sailors' understanding of the strategic importance of the Russian Arctic.

The 61 SKNIR' peacetime task organization is designed to meet current missions and security objectives. It also provides education and training of new recruited personnel, conducts demonstrations of capabilities in the region, assisting Northern Fleet's missions abroad, maintaining a level of combat readiness and mobilization. In addition, it should continue the transition from conscripted personnel to a professional NCO corps. The current number of personnel in 61st SKNIR is estimated to be 1,270. After mobilization, the combat capacity will be increased to 2,038.⁹⁹

The current regiment's organization is sufficient. Lack of adequate numbers of professional soldiers affects combat readiness. Formations with status of permanent combat readiness are still conscripts manned. This affects equipment and weapons system maintenance and other administrative issues. Day-by-day activities are organized in accordance with approved plans and directions from higher headquarters. The 61 SKNIR's training is focused on missions and objectives stipulated yearly by the Northern

⁹⁸Vladimir Shcherbakov, "Bratishka: 'Polar Bears' -the Enemy is no Salvation," *Special Forces Journal* (February 2004), http://www.bratishka.ru/archiv/2004/2/2004_2_1.php (accessed 19 May 2013).

⁹⁹Global Security Organization, "Naval Infantry-Organization and Equipment," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mp-toe.htm> (accessed 23 April 2013).

Fleet Deputy Commander for Coastal Defense and his staff for maintaining security in the Arctic Coast.

The 200th MIB and the 61 SKNIR are structurally well organized to face the current geo-political situation in the Arctic region. The operational environment and increased public attention require a high level of force readiness for different scenarios. Both units are moderately ready to conduct combat operations in the Arctic, and will reach their level of combat readiness in case of full professionalization of the force; or in case of war, by conducting a mobilization process. The analyses of the current Russian strategic interests in the Arctic demonstrate how military strategic leadership dictates the organization, capabilities, and missions for the RNNCG. The variety of military capabilities existing in the region should be able to support the higher command's intentions to meet future regional challenges. The 200th MIB and 61 SKNIR are the formations that meet these regional challenges by conducting daily activities in the Arctic region.

Table 5. 61st SKNIR Task Organization and Level of

Professionalization

No.	Unit	Status	Note	Abbreviation
61st	Separate Kirkenes Naval Infantry Regiment headquarters	Active	100% Professional	BDE HQ
874 th	Separate Naval Infantry Battalion	1 CO – Active duty 2 CO – Conscript based 3 CO – Conscript based	Professional Conscripts based Conscripts based	874 SNIBN
876 th	Separate Airborne/Air assault Battalion	1 CO – Active duty 2 CO – Reserve* 3 CO – Reserve*	Professional Conscripts based Conscripts based	876 SAABN
886 th	Separate Reconnaissance Battalion	1 CO – Active duty 2 CO – Reserve* 3 CO – Reserve*	Conscripts based Conscripts based Conscripts based	886 SRBN
125 th	Separate Tank Battalion*	1 CO – Reserve* 2 CO – Reserve* 3 CO – Reserve*	EQP in L-T storage EQP in L-T storage EQP in L-T storage	125 TKBN
1591 st	Separate Howitzer Self-propelled Artillery Battalion	1 BTRY – Active 2 BTRY – Reserve* 3 BTRY – Reserve*	50% Professional EQP S-T storage EQP S-T storage	1591 SHSPARTYBN
1617 th	Separate ADA Rocket Artillery Battalion	1 BTRY – Active 2 BTRY – Reserve* 3 BTRY – Reserve*	50% Professional EQP S-T storage EQP S-T storage	1617 ADABN
75 th	Naval Military Hospital*	1 CO – Active Rest is in reserve	100% Professional EQP S-T storage	75 NMHOSP
317 th	Separate Naval Infantry Battalion “Kadr”	1 CO – Reserve* 2 CO – Reserve* 3 CO – Reserve*	EQP in L-T storage EQP in L-T storage EQP in L-T storage	317 SNIB “Kadr”
318 th	Separate Naval Infantry Battalion “Kadr”	1 CO – Reserve* 2 CO – Reserve* 3 CO – Reserve*	EQP in L-T storage EQP in L-T storage EQP in L-T storage	317 SNIB “Kadr”
-	Signal Battalion	1 CO – Active duty 2 CO – Reserve* 3 CO – Reserve*	50% Professional EQP S-T storage EQP S-T storage	SIGBN
-	Maintenance and Support Battalion	1 MNT CO – Active 2 SPLY CO – Active 3 TRSP CO – Active	50% Professional 50% Professional 50% Professional	MTBN
-	Engineer Company	1 PLT – Active 2 PLT – Reserve* 3 PLT – Reserve*	50% Professional EQP S-T storage EQP S-T storage	ENCO
-	Chemical Defense Company	1 PLT – Active 2 PLT – Reserve* 3 PLT – Reserve*	50% Professional EQP S-T storage EQP S-T storage	CBRN CO
-	Separate Engineer-Supper Battalion	1 PLT – 50% Active 2 PLT – 50% Active	Conscripts based Conscripts based	274 SEN BN
-	Separate Military Police Platoon	Active	50% Professional	
-	Orchestra	Active	90% Professional	
-	Training Center	Active	Conscripts based	
Note*	* Deployed/completed during mobilization process. - EQP S-T storage – weapons and equipment are in short-term storage. - EQP L-T storage – weapons and equipment are in long-term storage.			

Source: Created by author based on Global Security, “Naval Infantry-Organization and Equipment,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mp-toe.htm> (accessed 23 April 2013); “Naval Infantry 61st Regiment,” Specnaz Published Works, <http://specnaz.pbworks.com/w/page/17658080/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F%20%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%85%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B0> (accessed 23 April 2013); Public Information Office of the Russian Defense Ministry, “Киркенесская Краснознаменная бригада морской пехоты Северного флота,” http://flot.com/news/dayinhistory/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=6199 (accessed 19 May 2013); Vladimir Shcherbakov, “Where we Are, There-a Victory,” *Military Review*, <http://topwar.ru/1648-gde-my-tam-pobeda.html> (accessed 19 May 2013).

Table 6. 61st SKNIR Main Weapon Systems

Weapons type	Description	Quantity (pcs.)
T-80	Medium Tank	74
BTR-80	8x8 wheeled amphibious armored personnel carrier (APC)	59
2S1 "Gvozdika"	Self-propelled 122-mm howitzer	12
2S9 "Nona"	Self-propelled 120 mm mortar	22
2S23	Self-propelled 120 mm system	11
MT-LBT	Multi-purpose fully amphibious auxiliary armored tracked vehicle	134
PRP-3	Mobile Reconnaissance & Surveillance Point	4
1B119	Mobile reconnaissance point and Artillery fire control vehicle	15

Source: Created by author based on Global Security, "Naval Infantry-Organization and Equipment," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mp-toe.htm> (accessed 23 April 2013); Public Information Office of the Russian Defense Ministry, "Киркенесская Краснознаменная бригада морской пехоты Северного флота," http://flot.com/news/dayinhistory/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=6199 (accessed 19 May 2013); and Vladimir Shcherbakov, "Where we Are, There-a Victory," *Military Review*, <http://topwar.ru/1648-gde-my-tam-pobeda.html> (accessed 19 May 2013).

Officers' Education

Continuous development of the officers' corps is conducted through additional instruction classes as part of the "Commander's preparation" and individual professional development. Most capable officers are selected to participate in multiple courses¹⁰⁰ organized by higher echelons, where they can be selected for another position within their branch. Training programs are oriented on updates for training and education methodologies, knowledge of operational doctrine, and peacetime force management. Based on personal motivation and gained experience, young officers use their skills to train and educate the subordinate unit's personnel. The platoon leader's position is held for 24-36 months, and company command for about 24-48 months. While serving in

¹⁰⁰Russian Federation Defense Ministry Secretariat, Order No. 85 of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, *Training Courses for Officers Corps of the Land Component*, March 2003, <http://open.lexpro.ru/document/87506#1> (accessed 21 April 2013).

command positions, officers are studying the current tactical and operational environment. Commanders base their activity on higher headquarters guidance, and train and execute a wide spectrum of Arctic missions in accordance with approved plans.¹⁰¹

The overall percentage of young officers serving in the ground force of the RNNCG consists of only seven percent per year, representing about seven to 10 officers in every unit (brigade/regiment).

Senior Officers' Education

Senior officers' development is based on previous experiences, skills, positions held, years of service, and branch. Ranks for senior military officers in the Russian military are between major and colonel for the ground component and third, second, and first class naval captain ranks. The decision to stay in a commander or staff position within brigade/regiment is a key priority in continuing a military career. In most cases, this occurs after completing company command, or after two years as a member of a brigade/regiment staff.¹⁰² The senior officers of military personnel will hold key positions in a brigade-division structure, and the leadership of the Armed Forces puts a great emphasis on the education and development of this type of military personnel. Below are some of the development programs for senior ranking officers of the Russian military:

¹⁰¹Nikolay D. Frolov, Mihail F. Semenov, and Leonid A. Charkevich, "Organization of Combat and Command Training in the Units," Tambov Technical University, Tambov, Oblast, Russia, 2002, <http://www.tstu.ru/education/elib/pdf/2002/harkev1.pdf> (accessed 20 May 2013).

¹⁰²Global Security Organization, "Russian Army - Overview," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/army-intro.htm> (accessed 30 May 2013).

1. Career development courses: depends on the branch or service, organized and conducted by higher headquarters. Course Length is from two weeks to six months.
2. Education in Branch and Service Military Academies: are post-graduate professional military schools for experienced commissioned officers who already have the equivalent of a Bachelor's degree. Upon graduation, these officers receive the equivalent of Master's degree and (if trained in military leadership) are appointed as battalion commanders or higher (from lieutenant colonel and up). Graduates having non-command training are appointed to various staff positions that are normally equivalent in rank to major or lieutenant colonel. The length of the academy is two years.
3. Education in Military Academy of the General Staff: officers selected for this academy would have first attended the appropriate service or branch academy. Graduates who were not already generals or admirals usually are promoted to this rank a short time after completing the course. The length of the academy is only two years, in contrast to the three years for the branch and service academies.
4. Distance Military Education: newly developed and approved concept. To join the distance military education, the candidate should be active duty military. The order of admission in educational institutions and on the distance military education is determined by federal laws and other regulatory legal acts. Officers can receive distance military education without leaving the existing service. For the convenience of students and to promote initiatives for the

distance military education, some military units are equipped with computer labs and classrooms. They can get distance higher education via the Internet.¹⁰³

The battalion commanders are future leaders in the brigade's command and control system. Selection of the candidates to receive a battalion command is strict and rigorous. Usually candidates have an experience in company (battery) command or at least in senior staff positions; promotable majors, physically and psychologically fit. After selection, the candidates are appointed for short-term professional courses such "Vistrel,"¹⁰⁴ conducted in Moscow, as part of the Russian Federation Combined Arms Military Academy. During this education process, future battalion commanders emphasize battalion level activity on the battlefield, the battalion's activity as an independent tactical element, or as a part of the brigade (task force). In addition, troop management and education classes are conducted emphasizing methodology of conducting exercises, sessions, and logistic activities. After graduation, the candidates are on "standby," ready to receive battalion command in different parts of the Russian Federation. During training process the candidates develop regional combat operations projects related to their future assignments. These are related to different aspects of combat operations in the Arctic, mountainous, or jungle environments.

Time in battalion command is based on different circumstances and ranges from 24-48 months. The next development phase after battalion command is education in a

¹⁰³ Moscow State Industrial University, *Correspondence Distance Education: Distance Military Education*, Vfmgui.ru, http://vfmgui.ru/zaochnoe_voennoe_obrazovanie_670/index.html (accessed 21 April 2013).

¹⁰⁴ S. Fedoseev, "Vistrel—'Field Academy' for Officer's Corps," Vadimvswar.narod.ru, http://vadimvswar.narod.ru/ALL_OUT/TiVOut0809/Vistr/Vistr001.htm (accessed 21 April 2013).

Branch and Service Military Academy, with future potential to be promoted to the next military rank, and becoming a member of the brigade's leadership or chief of section within the brigade staff. The last development stage for senior officers is education in the Military Academy of the General Staff. That will create the option to receive brigade command or continue a military career in operational level staff. The overall academic situation permits the development and maintenance of a high leadership level, as well preparation of commanders for their future assignments.

NCO Professionalization

The term "professionalization" in Russian military doctrine calls for transformation of the recruiting system from conscription based to a professional volunteer force. Candidates arriving in the Armed Forces recruiting centers are more interested in the military service, especially after the government's new decision to increase service pay. The Armed Forces are working with existing human materiel, building a professional force on previously conscripted personnel, signing short-term contracts for at least three years. This military society layer is called "*kontraktniki*," from which the military leadership decided to create a professional non-commissioned officers (NCO) corps.¹⁰⁵

The role of the NCO corps in the Russian military is still underestimated both at the battalion and brigade levels and not understood. Foreign NCO corps development experience does not work for the Russian military, because of multiple issues such as:

¹⁰⁵Russian Federation Defense Ministry, Office for Public Affairs, "Contracting Service," Recrut.mil.ru, <http://recrut.mil.ru/career/soldiering/qualification/soldier.htm> (accessed 19 May 2013).

low personal educational level, insufficient legal base, and a huge reliance on the officer corps as the main command and control element of the unit. These issues do not provide any space for maneuver in implementation of the professionalization doctrine.

The Arctic brigade's NCO Corps is in transition from conscription to a professional force. At least one battalion out of three is filled with "contractors," who previously served as conscripted soldiers for 18 months, and decided to sign the contract with the Armed Forces at the end of their basic period of duty. The role and career evolution of the NCO candidate is different from the beginning of his duty. Based on initial results achieved during basic combat training, the best soldiers are selected to join a so called "young leaders course" that is designed to train candidates for squad/team level leadership and become assistants for the platoon leader. The length of this course is five and a half months.

Beginning in January 2009, the Russian Senior military leadership created state-level NCO schools based on 19 military educational institutions of the Defense Ministry. According to the new concept, in 2016 the new Russian Federation Armed Forces should reach a strength of one million personnel, with a significant reduction in the warrant officers' corps of 140,000, and as an exchange will require about 250,000 NCO's.¹⁰⁶

Professionalization of the NCO Corps is one of the largest Russian military projects. Financial benefits assist in building up the NCO Corps. The use of developed NCO concepts will require time and human resources. Sufficient results should be estimated by 2016, when the first five generations of the professional NCO corps will

¹⁰⁶Aif Reazan, "The First Graduates of the Training Center Sergeants Pass State Exams in Ryazan," Rzn.aif.ru, November 2012, <http://rzn.aif.ru/society/news/69598> (accessed 20 May 2013).

graduate from military educational institutions. Good number of the NCOs should arrive in Arctic brigades that should influence on “professionalization” level of the force.

Human Resources Required to Establish and Maintain Control over the Arctic Regions

In accordance with Russian Federation Maritime Doctrine, the RNNCG area of responsibility comprises the Russian Federation territories and maritime areas of the Barents and the Kara Seas. Additionally, it includes the coastal territories from Kola to Taymir Peninsulas and extends north to the islands of Severnaya Zemlya, and east to Franz Josef Land.



Figure 2. RNNCG Area of Responsibility

Source: Created by author based on Google Earth, “Russia, Murmanskaya Oblast, Kola Peninsula,” <https://maps.google.com/maps?q=google&aq=f&um=1&ie=UTF-8&hl=en&sa=N&tab=wl> (accessed 26 April 2013).

Resources and capabilities required to re-establish and maintain the Arctic territories are very costly for the Russian Government. Strategic documents on the Russian Arctic development that are currently approved assess the social and economic situation as critical. The situation regarding living conditions is devastating. Civilian and military personnel are leaving these places these areas and going outside of the Arctic region. In addition, there are other problems such as a lack of social service networks; low dynamics in the human resettlement including education, health, culture, physical culture and sports; the condition of housing and basic health services are not enough; and there are even insufficient provisions for safe drinking water. All of these factors affect troop morale, combat readiness, and the families of the soldiers stationed there.

The RNNCG leaders uses different methods and approaches to maintain and develop healthy and comfortable duty conditions for military personnel and their families. They emphasize the importance of delivery of high-quality materiel support, selection and employment of qualified personnel, and development of existing infrastructure. The increase in Russian defense spending in 2013 is supporting the development of military capabilities and resource development in the Arctic region.¹⁰⁷

Peace and Wartime Human Resources Availability

The RNNCG was based on the Northern Navy force structure and infrastructure already in existence. Military personnel in Russia have become accustomed to devastating living conditions, permanent problems with logistics support, and severe

¹⁰⁷Oliver Bloom, "Russia Plans 60% Increase in Defense Budget by 2013," Center for Strategic Studies, <http://csis.org/blog/russia-plans-60-increase-defense-budget-2013> (accessed 24 April 2013).

climate of the northwestern boundary region of the Russian Federation. After the reorganization of the Russian military command structure in 2009, the decision to create a military district system was followed by a combination of military organizations located in the same area of operations. The newly created Western military district¹⁰⁸ comprised the Murmansk Oblast, with Northern Fleet as the most northern regionally aligned element of the Russian military security system and units of land and aviation components. Due to combined task organization, the RNNCG was assigned to conduct its missions over maritime and ground surfaces of the European Arctic. The ability to shape and maintain a pool of trained personnel that can operate in extremely difficult conditions has become a problematical task for the RNNCG.

Financial benefits for those serving in extreme conditions began with the approved military budget for 2011-2012 and become an initial point for the basis of the creation of the professional force. The idea of signing contracts between the Ministry of Defense and military personnel produced an opportunity to man units at a minimum level of combat readiness. Positions that required permanent combat readiness (team/squad leaders, weapon and C2 system operators, and vehicles and drivers) were filled with professional soldiers (“contractors”), and remaining positions became filled with conscripted soldiers.¹⁰⁹ That model of human resources management spread between

¹⁰⁸Chancellery of the President of the Russian Federation, Decree no. 1144, *Military-Administrative Fragmentation of the Russian Federation* (Moscow, Russia: The Russian Federation President’s Chancellery, 2010), annex 1, 1.

¹⁰⁹A. D. Rabinovich, “Interest Supplements to Wages for Work in the Far North and Equivalent Areas,” National Labor Union, September 2009, <http://www.kadrovik.ru/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=10422> (accessed 20 May 2013).

most of the units within the RNNCG, and enabled effective control over the mobilization process and mission requirements. The peacetime human resources capability is considered to be sufficient. Situational scenarios do not require large numbers of personnel. Nevertheless, the partial force mobilization concept is still in place, and reservists' training is conducted regularly.

The wartime human resources capability is based on the mobilization concept. In accordance with the Russian Military Reform, the concept of state level mobilization of the economy and technological resources will be reduced.¹¹⁰ That modification will permit the transfer of equipment and facilities stored for mobilization to fill current needs for spare parts. A unit's mobilization plan will only cover shortages in human resources. In addition, the Russian military experience from two Chechnya campaigns and the five days war with Georgia in 2008, demonstrated that in those situations there was no need to conduct a mobilization process. As a result, in the case of a large military conflict, the military peacetime capability will rapidly transition to wartime capability using human resources as the only reserve component.¹¹¹

An important aspect of human resources is having qualified and trained personnel to occupy the right specialties. Officer education and training specialties are sufficient. However, soldier and NCO specialties require specific attention. The mechanism of building up a professional force is based on civilian human resources. Every six months,

¹¹⁰Michael Barabanov and Alexei Gaidai, "Development of the Naval Component of the Russian Fleet," *New Russian Army* (Moscow, Russia: Center for Strategic and Technological Analysis, 2010), 25.

¹¹¹Alexey Gaidai, "Development of the Land Forces Component of the Russian Army," in *New Russian Army* (Moscow, Russia: Center for Strategic and Technological Analysis, 2010), 29.

the RNNCG receives 2,150 conscripts that allow it to maintain the minimum readiness level of the non-permanent readiness military formations. For many recruits, service in the Army and the Navy units is attractive because after only six months of service it is possible to arrange a contract with the Ministry of Defense and continue to perform their duties, receiving a good salary. The basic contract consists of length of service, obligations and responsibilities between the parties. Annually, about 11 percent of recruits fill existing professional NCO corps slots. Professional military evaluation of the Arctic units is conducted annually, involving every military individual. An inspection team from the RNNCG completes a complex evaluation on every military formation and every soldier individually. The complex evaluation consists of a command post exercise to evaluate staff activity and field exercises assessing combat readiness, fire, movement and maneuver, and other military capabilities. Individual assessment of military performance evaluates individuals in basic disciplines such as physical fitness, firearms handling, CBRN protection, Army doctrine, and tactics. The annual professional evaluation is considered to be the most important event, and assessment results influence further individual development and basic pay.¹¹²

Human resources availability depends on many factors. The Russian senior leadership pays significant attention in the build-up of the professional army and tries to reduce economic, educational, and organizational factors which oppose the creation of a qualified and trained military force. Individual professionalization conducted through

¹¹²Office for Press and Media of the Western Military District, “The Naval Infantry of the Northern Fleet is Ready to Conduct Combat Operations in the Arctic,” FLOT.com, http://flot.com/news/navy/?ELEMENT_ID=110070 (accessed 19 May 2013).

mechanism of selection, recruitment, basic and advanced training, conscripts contracting, and further annual evaluation, permits them to maintain available human resources ready to accomplish mission requirements.¹¹³

Military Facilities and Key Infrastructure

Pechenga (see figure 3) is an urban type settlement that comprises the primary facilities and infrastructure of the 200MIB and 61SKNIR. In addition, Pechenga is considered to be an administrative (municipal) district that comprises six other important urban settlements, with a total civilian population of 3,188 as of 2010.

¹¹³Russian Armed Forces Recruiting, “Professional Military Service,” Contract-army.ru, February 2012, <http://contract-army.ru/> (accessed 19 May 2013).



Figure 3. The Pechenga and Sputnik Military Garrisons View from High Ground

Source: Pechenga Official Web Page, “Pechenga History,” Pechenga51.ru, <http://www.pechenga51.ru/mun/history.shtml> (accessed 29 April 2013); Sergey Tuchashvili, “Sputnik,” Vk.com, http://vk.com/photo-6059272_281513085 (accessed 21 April 2013).

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought a reduction of the armed forces that affected all military formations located in the Kola Peninsula. The majority of them were reduced or disbanded. The lack of finances did not permit the Defense Ministry to

maintain Pechenga's infrastructure, and the lack of logistic support and regular maintenance during the 1990s resulted in the collapse of the district.

At the moment, every unit of the Russian ground forces in the Arctic has all of the elementary infrastructures to support its daily activity. In case of severe climate conditions, units are capable of an autonomous regime of activity for three months. If necessary, units can support the local population with basic needs that is achieved through a well-developed logistic storage systems and energy platforms.¹¹⁴ The key infrastructure consists of the following administrative buildings: unit headquarters, logistics headquarters, command and control headquarters, and a medical facility. The supporting infrastructure consists of lodging, supporting and maintenance blocks, conscript and NCO barracks, officer and conscript canteens, warehouses and storages. The force protection infrastructure consists of a permanent guard facility, main and alternative entry/exit checkpoints, and a fire station. The training infrastructure consists of classroom buildings, shooting ranges for all types of weapons systems, aerodrome (not in use), tactical training fields, and a driving range for combat vehicles.¹¹⁵ The infrastructure permits Arctic formations to maintain a minimum level of readiness, the conduct of different types of troop training, and achievement of an eligible force protection level.

¹¹⁴Pechenga Official Web Page.

¹¹⁵Defense Ministry Forum, "Pechenga Military Unit No. 08275," Forum-mil.ru, May 2013, <http://www.forum-mil.ru/> (accessed 20 May 2013).

Combat Training's Environmental Specifications and Mission Requirements

Combat training is a focused and organized process aimed to educate and train qualified personnel with high moral psychological qualities, to achieve combat coordination between individual soldier, its unit (formation), and their staff (headquarters) in order to conduct combat operations and other tasks in accordance with the mission requirements.¹¹⁶

The RNNCG combat training is the main daily activity of military units and formations which includes the individual training of military and civilian personnel, combat coordination training (squad – battalion level), and headquarters training (battalion-brigade level). Combat training is conducted through classes and seminars, live fire training, field and command post exercises. During the training process, the military personnel learn and perform battlefield actions; study the purpose of the missions, adversary forces organizational structure, equipment exploitation methods, and combat use of weapons and equipment systems; and learn the military regulations and field manuals.¹¹⁷ Battalions and brigades (regiments) plan and conduct training activities in accordance with mission requirements for the current training year and estimated environmental challenges. Most of the training activities are replicated during both periods of Arctic winter and summer that provides an opportunity for military personnel to exercise combat activities during Arctic day and night. The majority of the field exercises with live fire and heavy combat vehicle driving are planned during the short

¹¹⁶Russian Federation Defense Ministry, “Combat Training,” Encyclopedia.mil.ru, http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details_rvsn.htm?id=12672@morfDictionary (accessed 1 May 2013).

¹¹⁷V. M. Shcherbovich, “Combat Training,” Russian Federation Defense Ministry, http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details_rvsn.htm?id=12672@morfDictionary (accessed 20 May 2013).

Arctic summer time.¹¹⁸ The RNNCG level exercises and key activities (with media involvement) are conducted during winter time in order to demonstrate the real capabilities of the Arctic brigades. For these types of key activities, the 200MIB and the 61 SKNIR train during summer. The RNNCG's stress on unit training activities and combat readiness is reasonable due to the increased attention from the local and international media over the Russian military concept of the "Arctic brigades."

The basis for planning and organization of brigade's (regiment's) training process is indicated in the commander's planning guidance for the upcoming training year. The brigade (regiment) commander is focusing his guidance on higher headquarters training and mission objectives for the upcoming training year, and updating them to the brigade mission requirements. The brigade's (regiment's) mission requirements are based on foundational documents that separate combat and non-combat missions between peace and wartime. Regional situational scenarios reflect the entire set of possible missions and alternative tasks.¹¹⁹ The unit's training plan for the upcoming year will be based on specific mission requirements, emphasizing the development of the capabilities of units in some specific area such "antiterrorism action" or "state border reinforcement." The entire plan will be divided into specific areas of development for every branch or service within the unit. Every branch (service) will include training objectives for individual professional development, squad to battalion level cohesion building, and the main brigade (regiment) level training activity of the year. The analysis of the current RNNCG

¹¹⁸Serghey Alexandrov, "Bratishka, Training Range: Arctic in Site," *Russian Special Forces Journal* (November 2012), http://www.bratishka.ru/archiv/2012/11/2012_11_1.php (accessed 20 May 2013).

¹¹⁹Russian Federation Defense Ministry, "Combat Training."

training and education system demonstrates limited contribution to mission requirements.¹²⁰

Due to a conscript based manning system, the training plan is still based on a period of one training year of conscription service which includes the individual soldier's development from squad to at least company level live fire exercise. Professional soldiers require yearly participation in the same training activity that affects their professional development. The necessity to develop parallel training programs is essential. The role of the professional soldier in the training and education of conscripted personnel is still not determined. Leader's positions at squad and platoon level are occupied by professional soldiers, and these are involved only in basic training of conscripted personnel.¹²¹

Officer training is conducted through separately developed "Commander's training" seminars and classes. The training involves the brigade's (regiment's) officers, and includes classes and seminars on different disciplines such as tactics, weapon system, physical fitness, political education, leadership, and others. In addition, command post exercises with higher and lower echelons permit the development of the brigade's (regiment's) staff functions and responsibilities.

The overall brigade (regiment) capability of conducting operations is evaluated during Combined Command Post and Field Exercises with other elements of the Federal Security System. An exercise of this type was conducted in the Pechenga district of the

¹²⁰Dmitry Boltenkov, "Naval Reforms of the Russian Federation: Reforms in the Northern Fleet," in *New Russian Army* (Moscow, Russia: Center for Strategic and Technological Analysis, 2010), www.cast.ru/files/New_Russian_Army_sm.pdf (accessed 20 May 2013), 93.

¹²¹Anatoly Socolov, "Combat Training – Basis for Military Perfection," in *Russian Weapons* information agency web page, <http://www.arms-expo.ru/049057054048124050051057051054.html> (accessed 30 May 2013).

Murmansk region in February 2013.¹²² Exercise participants were the RNNCG operational headquarters, Office of the Federal Security Service in the Murmansk Region and the Northern Fleet, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Murmansk region, and a division of the Federal Security Service of Russia and the forces of the Northern Fleet.¹²³

The organizers of the anti-terrorism exercise have taken note of the fact that there are many nuclear and radiation facilities located in the Arctic region, a large number of military units and enterprises, stored weapons, and explosives. Any of these sensitive sites may fall under the scope of terrorists. Therefore, according to the scenario, it was very important to prevent the penetration of suspicious persons, and in the case of their appearance, to be quickly defused. The main purpose of the coordinated action of the security forces has been the suppression of a terrorist attack on a military facility. The exercise involved more than 300 personnel and 30 units of wheeled and tracked vehicles. Motorized infantry, tank, rocket launchers, and self-propelled artillery batteries demonstrated that they could effectively move and shoot in rugged mountainous terrain and extremely cold environment. The analysis of this event demonstrates a basic level of coordination between military formations and the Federal security agency that enables the opportunity to improve interorganizational relationships at the regional level.

¹²²Vorobiova, “Antiterror in High North.”

¹²³Department of Strategic Information, “Across the Spectrum of Combat Operations,” *Red Star*, 4 February 2013, <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/news-menu/vesti/iz-vmf/severnoy-flot/item/7817-po-vsemu-spektru-boevoy-raboty> (accessed 20 May 2013).

Russian Armed Forces are capable of learning fast. Military experts realize all the advantages of the western military system. Use of C3IS, UAVs, training techniques, special equipment, all will be integrated in the Russian military system as soon as these are developed. However, Russian conceptual use of Arctic brigades still has its effect on military capabilities of other countries, interested in control of the Arctic region.

Interpretation of Findings

Information provided in the previous chapters, using a part of DOTMLPF analysis describes the current situation of the Russian military formations located in the Arctic region. That methodology helped to answer the primary research question: How does the Russian Federation develop tactical level military capabilities to support its strategic interests in the Arctic region? A detailed description of the processes and procedures used by tactical military formations (61 SKNIR and 200 MIB) to conduct tactical level operations, indicates that the efforts of the strategic leaders in development and maintaining military presence in the Arctic has improved. The comprehensive analysis displayed the following conclusions (interpretations):

1. Efforts of the Russian political leadership to implement initial steps of the *Russian Federation Military Doctrine* (Establish “Ends”) from strategic to operational level and from the operational to the tactical levels demonstrate low results. Arctic strategic military objectives stipulated in the doctrine stopped at the operational level headquarters and were not translated for the tactical level.
2. The newly approved military concept of enhancing interoperability with other security and federal agencies (“Ways”), responsible for consequences management and exceptional situations, is still in the development phase. A number of emergency

exercises such as “Antiterrorist action,” demonstrate that agencies of the Government of the Russian Federation were working on integration at some level of cohesion between involved organizations. Nevertheless, command and control, “supporting” and “supported” command relationships¹²⁴ at the strategic and operational levels are still not clear, and levels of responsibility are not clarified.

3. The Arctic Strategic and operational objectives are not translated into tactical tasks and missions to support existing field manuals¹²⁵ and regulations. Nevertheless, the concept of the RSS maintains a minimum level of combat readiness during peacetime. Tactical level formations continued their activity based on higher headquarters guidance, implementing only basic principles of the military doctrine.

4. Since December 2009, reorganization of the 200th MIB and the 61st SKNIR permitted removal of unnecessary equipment and reduce ineffective reserve “*Kadr*” units. Reorganization enabled some previously unoccupied positions to be filled with qualified personnel from reduced units. Another benefit and enhanced maintenance of the equipment and weapons systems due to a reduced demands for spare parts. In addition, the concept of the “professionalization of the force” allowed recruitment of “professional” soldiers from the conscription corps. This “professionalization” resulted in creating a minimum level of living conditions by rebuilding conscripts barracks into accommodations.

¹²⁴Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations: Command Relationships* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), GL-16.

¹²⁵Stanislav Zakaryan, “New Combat Manuals for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” Russian Weapons Information Agency, September 2011, <http://www.arms-expo.ru/049057054048124050053049056057.html> (accessed 20 May 2013).

5. Training is one of the most important elements of combat readiness. Leaders of the RNNCG have place emphasis on the readiness of both the 200th MIB and the 61st SKNIR. These units conduct multiple exercises based on RSS and execution of the tactical action in Arctic environment. Modern training programs are based on the same principles as used during Soviet times. These principles are: “high importance of the ideological component and pedagogical training of petty officers, the personnel reserve created among the junior commanders to replace officers, pay special attention to the training of competent specialist for extended service, without secondary education but trained in technical terms as a practice.”¹²⁶ Individual preparation emphasizes specialty training, knowledge of individual weapon systems, and individual action on the battlefield. Collective training is emphasized on unit cohesion, its level of preparedness to conduct activities on the battlefield, and weapons system management. The Russian military training system needs a revision to be adapted to modern warfare requirements. It was reflected during strategic command-post military exercise “Kavkaz 2012,” staged in Russia’s Southern Military District (MD) from 17 to 23 September 2012. This exercise tested key features of the reform of the Russian Armed Forces and operations conducted in restricted terrain.¹²⁷

6. Starting in 2010, Leadership and Education of the Russian Army personnel was mentioned quite often in the military reform of the Russian Federation. Senior

¹²⁶R. K. Reznikova, “Skills Training and Education of the Staff and the Junior Commanders of the Navy,” Russian Federation Defense Ministry, <http://ens.mil.ru/science/publications/more.htm?id=10431984@cmsArticle> (accessed 20 May 2013).

¹²⁷Roger McDermott, “Kavkaz 2012 Rehearses Defense of Southern Russia,” The Jamestown Foundation, 25 September 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39880 (accessed 20 May 2013).

leaders (battalion and brigade level) are educated in separate training programs and institutions. The major difficulty, which is Russian military is facing, is the creation of a “professional” soldier’s corps with an accent on development of the NCO Corps. These programs are still in the development phase and will require international expertise to be successful.

7. The personnel status of the “Arctic brigades” requires specific attention in the domains of vacant civilian positions such as qualified medical and educational personnel (nurses, medics and school teachers), and service and support personnel (mechanics, infrastructure management) in order to maintain basic living conditions in the Pechenga region, where the units are stationed.

8. Facilities in the Pechenga region require specific attention in the domains of development and maintenance. Infrastructure situated under civilian (local governance) control is under development. A number of key edifices were reconstructed to permit the reopening of the middle and high schools, the Pechenga Military Garrison’ Officers Club, the federal medical facility (state level), markets and stores. The military infrastructure situated under Defense Ministry’s development program permits the improvement of existing military infrastructure in terms of military family lodging, updating barracks and administrative building temperature maintenance capability, and develop lodging capacity for professional soldiers. These should improve the “professionalization” status of the force.

Table 7. Assessment of the RNNCG Ground Component Capabilities in DOTMLPF Spectrum

Assessment of the RNNCG Ground Component Capabilities in DOTMLPF Spectrum Secondary research questions	DOTMLPF Criterion	Evaluated Elements	Assessed Status
What types of tactical level ground capabilities exist to support Russian military interests in the European Arctic?	Relevance of the Doctrine (Satisfactory)	Strategic Doctrine	Cont. Dev.
		Operational Doctrine	Cont. Dev.
		Tactical Doctrine	Req. Dev.
		Joint Doctrine	Req. Dev.
	Organization (Satisfactory)	RNNCG (operational)	Satisfactory
		200 MIB	Satisfactory
		61 SKNIR	Satisfactory
		Other spt. units	Req. Dev.
	Leadership and Education (Requires development)	Officer's Corps	Cont. Dev.
		NCO's Corps	Req. Dev.
What human resources are required to establish and maintain control over the Arctic region?	Personnel (Requires development)	Professional soldiers	Req. Dev.
		Conscripted soldiers	Req. Dev.
How are the Russian tactical level military leaders managing training activities to maintain an essential pool of force, based on environmental specifications and mission requirements?	Training/Combat readiness (Requires development)	Military Personnel	Satisfactory
		Civilian Personnel	Req. Dev.
		Individual Training	Cont. Dev.
		Collective Training	Req. Dev.
		Filed Exercises	Req. Dev.
		Command Post Exercises	Req. Dev.
Evaluation	Color Code	Combat readiness Exercises	Req. Dev.
		Assessment	Percentage
		Good	Activity is done good without any significant issues during implementation
		In Continuous Development	Activity is done, but requires attention from higher HQ in domain of implementation
		Satisfactory	Activity is done with some issues, requires implication of the higher HQ in domain of implementation
		Requires development	Activity requires further development with implication of resources and subject matter experts
Red	Unsatisfactory	Requires significant attention from higher HQ, activity has failed, or unexecuted.	0-10%

Source: Created by author based on I. A. Kovalev, "Didactical Basis for Military Education," Edinoe Okno, 2005, <http://window.edu.ru/library/pdf2txt/806/69806/44966/page1> (accessed 20 May 2013); Margarete Klein, "Russia's Military Capabilities: Great Power: Ambitions and Reality" (Research paper, German Institute for Political and Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany, 2009), http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2009_RP12_kle_ks.pdf (accessed 20 May 2013).

Conclusion

This chapter was designed to provide effective informational support to the secondary research questions and offer a description and analysis using Functional Solution Analysis mechanisms by supporting each secondary question with some criterions in DOTMLPF spectrum. This analysis permitted a comprehensive evaluation (see table 7) of existing military capabilities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region. In addition, it demonstrated the challenges and perspectives of the RNNCG in relation to the current operational environment, doctrinal support, organizational structures, training and education, materiel support, human resources and facilities and infrastructure. Chapter 5 will provide conclusions and recommendations for further development of the problem.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The origin of this research paper was based on the concept of the militarization of the Arctic which is currently an important domain of international security. Increased Russian military presence in the Arctic is based on the intersection of political and economic objectives of the Government of the Russian Federation. By increasing the expenditures on defense the Government of the Russian Federation was able to expand existing military capabilities of the RNNCG, located on the Kola Peninsula, which has a role in getting control over the newly opened sea lines of communications and energy resources.

The purpose of the research was to analyze modern perspectives of possible tactical level operations in the Arctic region. The study examined the current activities and development of ground elements of the RNNCG for possible use in the Arctic operational environment. In addition, this study described the strategic interests of both the U.S. and the Russian Federation in the Arctic in regards to international security, regional stability, protection of newly opened sea lines of communications, and energy resources. The study evidenced the necessity of maintaining the U.S. military presence in the Arctic based on the analysis of current Russian military activity.

This chapter provides an overview of the study, together with both conclusions and resulting recommendations. It will include a brief summary of previous chapters, interpretations of the findings, recommendations, and will conclude with a summary of the value of this research study.

The main idea of previous chapters was to provide the reader with an overall understanding of the Arctic environment primarily from a military perspective. Information gained through an understanding of the existing Russian military capabilities in the Arctic will create a comprehensive image of how tactical level operations could be conducted in the Arctic. Chapter 1 set the stage for the research by building a comprehensive image of the Arctic operational environment through a multilateral description of the history, geography, economy, legitimacy, and other aspects. Political and military delineations within the Arctic region were also discussed. Also included in the chapter was an overview of the project and provided the research question, supporting questions, limitations, delimitations, and the scope of the study. Chapter 2 discussed the strategic and the operational documents of both governments of the U.S. and the Russian Federation that were related to the Arctic region. Both governments define in these documents their major political and security objectives in the region in order to maintain homeland security, provide economic support for the local population, and develop capabilities for the use of new sea routes around Europe. Chapter 3 provides an explanation of the methodology used to answer the primary and secondary research questions. A clear and complete description of the steps to be followed during the research is provided. The emphasis is on the methodology used to answer the primary and secondary research questions. Also, a general description is given of all criteria and indicators used to support the main research question. Chapter 4 provides effective informational support to the secondary research questions and offers a description and analysis using Functional Solution Analysis mechanisms by supporting each secondary question. This analysis permits a comprehensive evaluation of existing military

capabilities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region. In addition, it demonstrates the challenges and perspectives of the RNNCG in relation to the current operational environment, doctrinal support, organizational structures, education and training, and human resources.

Implications

The rapid building of the military capabilities in the Arctic region has increased international attention on the Russian Northern Fleet. The introduction of the 200th MIB into the Northern Fleet's task organization from Western Military District Land Component Command was an example of fleet reorganization. This action has received different comments and suggestions that urged the approval in February 2013, of the *Russian Federation Strategy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond*. The Strategy became another indicator of the focus of the Government of the Russian Federation on the Arctic. The new military concept of adding a mechanized force element as a component part of the navy, led to the development of a new type of capability, with the involvement of coastal defense forces, marine and mechanized components. A nine-month experimental period of the 200th MIB demonstrated the effectiveness of the mechanized component in the RNNCG. Cooperation and coordination efforts between maritime and mechanized infantry elements and coastal defense forces created a capable force that can react to different situational scenarios in order to support strategic interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic.

Unexpected Findings

Some of the unexpected findings are related to task organization and organic equipment. Removal of the reservists units (type“*Kadr*”) from the task organization of the 61st SKNIR and the 200th MIB, which permitted reinforcement with both existing personnel, and the use of stored reserve equipment to maintain existing capabilities. This was done in accordance with Russian Military Reform that emphasized modification of the mobilization system and complete reduction of reservists units in order to achieve a force which was capable of achieving rapid professionalization.

Recommendations

The author’s recommendations are based on the description of the Russian military capabilities as well as a description of estimated activities of both the U.S. military and the NATO. Political, economic, and military factors all place the Russian Federation in the top ranking countries involved in Arctic territorial disputes. Countries such as Norway, Finland and Sweden have limited organic military capabilities in providing early warning and security systems. Nevertheless, the militarization of the Arctic should be limited because increase in NATO’s involvement there, will only increases the tension. Based on budget limitations and current technological advancements, the study concludes that the probability of military conflict in the Arctic region over the next 15 years remains low. Military presence in the Arctic should be limited to bilateral military cooperation and permanent air-space-sea monitoring to maintain control over the Arctic region.

Recommendations for Further Study

Some unanswered questions appear on different topics beginning with international relations and the economic involvement of other nations in the Russian Arctic development and reconstruction. Further study of future economic investments of the Russian Government in the development of the Arctic region can become an interesting topic for the research. Another recommendation is the study of the involvement of the Far East countries (China, Japan, and India) in territorial exploration and development of oil platforms in the Arctic, and their strategic interests and objectives. Lastly, continuous development of the Russian military capabilities in the Arctic region, monitoring of territorial claims, and development of another Arctic brigade (Archangelsk), would be an excellent research topic.

Research activities that could be approached or accomplished in a different manner are focused on informational support. An informational support system should be created initially, emphasizing points of interests, using different methods of research, and permanent monitoring of the activities in the region may affect the research. Topics related to development of new military capabilities are very sensitive in the domain of relevant documentation and sources of information. Analysis of subject matter experts' opinions and their relation to existing facts and assumptions should be permanently taken into consideration.

Recommendations for Action

The author's first recommendation for action is to enhance the Security Cooperation Programs between the U.S. and the Arctic states that should result in less militarization of the Arctic. Main cooperation efforts should emphasize aspects of

homeland security specified in strategic documents. Second, the U.S., Canada, Norway, and Denmark should evaluate existing military capabilities and create an opportunity to conduct joint maritime patrols in the Arctic region. Third, Russian military forces located in Kola Peninsula should be involved in multinational exercises and missions abroad through NATO cooperation programs. Finally, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities should maintain continuous control over the Arctic region.

Summary

The Russian militarization of the Arctic requires specific monitoring. Increased military presence in the Arctic is based on political and strategic objectives that intersect with economic interests of other states. The RNNCG represents the main force capable of conducting limited activities in the Arctic region. However, it requires further development of its capabilities for long-term. The ground component of the RNNCG represents a specific interest for international military experts due to their specific functions, responsibilities, and current activity in the Arctic operational environment. New perspectives in getting control over the newly opened sea lines of communications and energy resources required reconstitution of defense capabilities in the Russian Arctic. That helps in understanding the modern perspectives of tactical level operations in the Arctic region, and how the Government of the Russian Federation ties Arctic strategic interests to tactical level activities.

With increased military expenditures, the Russian Federation Government was able to modify the security concept of the Russian Arctic, and strengthen its military position in the European Arctic. The study qualitatively analyzed tactical level capabilities of the Russian Northern Fleet which allows a comprehensive evaluation and

prediction of future Russian military activity in the Arctic. In addition, it will permit understanding of the future concept of the “Arctic brigades,” planned by the Russian Defense Ministry to be created in the near future.

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